non-cooperative game

Adopted non-cooperative meaning

Identify whether the account emphasises individual strategic choice, the treatment of binding agreements, or an explicit implementation of cooperative arrangements.

1. Which definition of non-cooperative game is adopted, and which source or theoretical tradition supports it? provenance
2. How does this definition treat agreements that are binding because an enforcement mechanism is represented? boundary

Interdependence and cooperation

Locate dependencies among individual choices and allow aligned interests or cooperative outcomes without changing the game's classification.

1. Whose best choice can change when another player's strategy changes? definition
2. Is cooperation an available behaviour within this game, or is the representation instead built from coalition values and allocation rules? boundary

Player identification

Record the justification for treating a person, organisation or other decision-making unit as one player.

1. Which entities are players, and which decisions does each control independently? definition
2. If an organisation is represented as one player, which internal conflicts or delegation problems are being abstracted away? boundary

Strategy and payoff specification

Distinguish an action at a decision point from a complete contingent strategy and specify the resulting outcome evaluation.

1. What must a strategy specify at every decision point available to its player, including points not reached in the proposed play? definition
2. How do strategy profiles and chance events determine outcomes, and how does each player rank those outcomes or lotteries? measurement
3. Which constraints are genuine restrictions on feasible actions, and which are merely costly actions encoded in payoffs? boundary

Decision information

Record what a player can distinguish when choosing, rather than inferring knowledge from chronological order alone.

1. Which moves precede each decision, and which of those moves can the deciding player observe? definition
2. Which histories belong to the same information set, and does the representation assume players remember their earlier information and choices? definition

Belief foundations

Distinguish specified distributions, player beliefs and analyst uncertainty, including belief requirements at unreached information sets.

1. Which characteristics are privately known, and what prior distributions or player-specific beliefs are assumed about them? definition
2. Which observations update beliefs, and what restrictions does the selected solution concept impose after events assigned zero probability? boundary
3. What evidence supports the information and belief assumptions rather than merely making the analysis tractable? provenance

Agreement implementation

Record how an agreement changes information, available actions or consequences, including the role of any enforcing party.

1. Can messages directly alter payoffs or feasible actions, or do they operate only through the information and expectations they convey? definition
2. Who detects and penalises a breach, and what makes that enforcement feasible and credible? action

Intertemporal incentives

Identify the horizon and continuation incentives needed for proposed rewards, punishments or reputational effects.

1. What horizon, continuation probability or discounting convention governs the value of future outcomes? measurement
2. Which deviations can players detect, and are the proposed responses optimal when the histories triggering them occur? action

Candidate solution test

Record the chosen concept, relevant strategy class, verification method and any unresolved multiplicity or existence issue.

1. Which solution concept is claimed, and why is it appropriate to this game's timing and information structure? definition
2. Which unilateral deviations and, where required, continuation and belief conditions have been checked? measurement
3. Does the analysis establish existence, identify one candidate, enumerate solutions or justify a selection among multiple solutions? boundary

Supported strategic conclusions

Separate mathematically verified properties from empirical expectations and recommendations sensitive to modelling choices.

1. What observations would support or challenge the proposed behaviour, and can they distinguish it from other equilibria or learning processes? measurement
2. Which conclusions survive plausible changes in payoffs, information, rationality assumptions and equilibrium selection? boundary
3. Which analyses or interventions are supported now, and which require additional information about the players or interaction? action

Check these first

Recalled without web access and unsourced; every item is a lead to verify.

1. Which of these check these first hold for the sense of non-cooperative game this model covers, and on what evidence? provenance

Kinds and varieties

Recalled without web access and unsourced; every item is a lead to verify.

1. Which of these kinds and varieties hold for the sense of non-cooperative game this model covers, and on what evidence? provenance

Real-world use

Recalled without web access and unsourced; every item is a lead to verify.

1. Which of these real-world use hold for the sense of non-cooperative game this model covers, and on what evidence? provenance

Typical measurements

Recalled without web access and unsourced; every item is a lead to verify.

1. Which of these typical measurements hold for the sense of non-cooperative game this model covers, and on what evidence? provenance

Failure modes and hazards

Recalled without web access and unsourced; every item is a lead to verify.

1. Which of these failure modes and hazards hold for the sense of non-cooperative game this model covers, and on what evidence? provenance

Neighbouring kinds and how to tell them apart

Recalled without web access and unsourced; every item is a lead to verify.

1. Which of these neighbouring kinds and how to tell them apart hold for the sense of non-cooperative game this model covers, and on what evidence? provenance