Incident Response
Provide the format-neutral context an agent needs to open, operate, inspect and close an incident response engagement from detection through containment, recovery coordination and lessons learned.
Bundle → Layer → Finding → Questions Filled
7 bundles · 15 layers · 26 findings · 108 questions
Mandate, Authority and Readiness Who is empowered to respond, with what authority and decision rights, and what preparedness the capability relies on when a case opens.
Response Mandate and Authority
The declared charter, constituency, service scope and the decision rights exercised during a case.
Response capability charter and constituency
The published mandate of the responding capability: mission, constituency, sponsorship, authority level over constituent systems, supported incident types and level of support.
- What authority does the responding capability hold over constituent systems, and is it advisory, shared or full? authority
- Which constituency, sites and organisational units does this capability serve? ownership
- Which incident types are supported and at what declared level of support? definition
- Which published version of the service description governs this case, and when was it last updated? provenance
Case roles and decision rights
Named roles engaged on the case, their delegated decision rights, handover points and the escalation trigger to crisis management.
- Who holds the decision right for containment actions that disrupt production services? authority
- How is case ownership handed over between shifts or teams without losing accountability? process
- Which condition escalates the case from response coordination into crisis management support? exception
- How are conflicts between response, legal and business owners recorded and resolved? decision
Preparedness Baseline
Which governing procedure version and which readiness preconditions the case relies on.
Governing playbook and procedure binding
The identity, version and validity window of the playbook, procedure or plan invoked to govern the case, plus whether the case runs ad hoc.
- Which playbook or procedure version governs this case, and is it still within its validity window? identity
- What playbook type applies, such as detection, investigation, mitigation or remediation? classification
- If no playbook exists for this situation, what is recorded in its place? exception
- How is the bound playbook version verified as unaltered at the moment of binding? validation
Readiness preconditions relied upon
The readiness state the case depends on: reachable contacts, available tooling access, current training and exercise evidence, referenced rather than re-assessed.
- Which readiness preconditions must hold before this response tier can be operated? requirement
- What external assessment or exercise evidence is relied upon, and when was it produced? evidence
- Which readiness gaps were known and accepted at the time the case opened? quality
- Are out-of-band contact and authentication means available if primary channels are compromised? security
Case Identity, Scope and Triage How the response case is identified, bounded and prioritised, and how it binds to external classification vocabularies.
Case Identification and Scope
The identifiers, cross-references and perimeter that define which response engagement this is.
Response case identity, cross-references and perimeter
The authoritative case identifier, identifiers held by cooperating parties, the reference to the incident record handled, and the declared perimeter of the engagement.
- What is the authoritative identifier of this response case and which system issued it? identity
- Which tracking numbers do cooperating teams, vendors or authorities use for the same engagement? relationship
- Which incident record does this case handle, and is the link one-to-one? composition
- What is inside the response perimeter and what was explicitly excluded from it? spatial
- How are duplicate or related cases merged, split or superseded without losing identifiers? lifecycle
Triage and Classification Binding
The response-side prioritisation decision and the bindings to external classification vocabularies.
Triage decision and response tier
The recorded decision assigning a response tier, target response clocks and resourcing, together with the criteria version applied.
- What response tier was assigned, by whom, and against which criteria version? decision
- Which response clocks start on triage and what are their targets? temporal
- Under what conditions is the response tier re-evaluated during the case? state
- How does the assigned response tier relate to the severity held on the incident record? relationship
External classification and technique bindings
Bindings from the case to external vocabularies for incident class, adversary technique and exchange-format attributes, always with catalogue version.
- Which external classification class and type were assigned, from which taxonomy version? classification
- Which adversary techniques are referenced and against which catalogue version? interoperability
- What is the declared purpose of documenting this case for exchange, such as mitigation, reporting or traceback? interoperability
- How are bindings revalidated when an external catalogue publishes a new version? validation
Detection Intake and Analysis How the engagement was triggered, how an event became a declared incident, and what the analysis concluded for response purposes.
Detection and Report Intake
Receipt of the trigger and the decision that promotes it to a handled incident.
Detection and report intake
How the engagement was triggered: discovery source, reporting party, channel, submitted content and receipt acknowledgement.
- By which discovery source was the situation first noticed, such as monitoring, audit, external notification or law enforcement? provenance
- Who reported the situation and how was the reporting party authenticated? identity
- What acknowledgement was returned to the reporter and within what interval? process
- How complete and reliable was the initial report, and what was missing? quality
Event to incident declaration
The decision that promotes one or more events to a declared incident under response, including the declaring authority and the basis.
- Who declared the incident and under which delegated authority? authority
- On what basis was the event judged to be an incident rather than a near miss or false positive? definition
- How is a declaration reversed if analysis later shows no incident occurred? exception
- Is a near miss recorded even when no incident is declared, and where? event
Investigation and Analysis
Analytical conclusions and the response-side impact assessment that drive containment and notification decisions.
Analysis findings, hypotheses and confidence
Working hypotheses, supporting and contradicting observations, confidence, and the root cause status as understood during response.
- What hypotheses about the attack path are open, and what would falsify each one? quality
- What confidence is attached to each conclusion and on what scale? measurement
- Has a root cause been established, and is it provisional or confirmed? state
- Which observations underpin a finding and where are the underlying data held? provenance
Response-side impact assessment
The assessed impact used to drive response decisions and notification thresholds, distinguished from the incident model's authoritative impact facts.
- Which impact categories are assessed for response purposes and on what scale? measurement
- What is the current estimate of affected parties or records, and how uncertain is it? measurement
- Does the assessed impact cross a reporting or escalation threshold, and which one? constraint
- Is cross-border or multi-jurisdiction impact likely, and on what basis? spatial
Response Actions and Recovery Coordination Authorisation and tracking of response actions, deviations from the governing playbook, and the coordination interface to continuity and recovery plans.
Action Authorisation and Tracking
What was authorised, by whom, with what intended effect and what recorded outcome reference.
Response action authorisation and outcome reference
Each authorised containment, eradication or mitigation action with its target reference, approver, requested and completed times and a reference to execution evidence held by the executing system.
- Which action was authorised, against which target, and who approved it? authority
- What effect was the action intended to achieve and how would success be recognised? requirement
- Where is the evidence that the action was carried out, and who holds it? evidence
- Is the action reversible, and what is the rollback path if it causes harm? constraint
Containment decisions, trade-offs and playbook deviations
Recorded decision points where containment competed with evidence preservation or service availability, and any departure from the bound playbook.
- Which trade-off between containment speed, service availability and evidence preservation was chosen and why? decision
- Where did the response depart from the bound playbook, and who approved the departure? exception
- What conditions would abort or reverse the containment strategy? constraint
- Which dependencies or third parties had to consent before containment could proceed? relationship
Recovery Coordination
The interface between the response case and externally governed continuity and recovery plans, and the response-side verification of restoration.
Continuity and recovery plan invocation binding
The reference, trigger, parameters and acknowledgement recorded when the response requests invocation of a continuity or recovery plan governed by another model.
- Which continuity or recovery plan version was requested, and by which reference? identity
- What condition triggered the invocation request and who was authorised to make it? authority
- Which case-specific parameters were passed with the invocation request? composition
- What acknowledgement or activation reference was returned by the plan owner? interoperability
Restoration verification and residual risk hand-off
The response-side verification that response objectives were met, the heightened monitoring period, and the residual risk handed to risk owners.
- How was it verified that affected services and systems returned to an acceptable state? validation
- When was recovery reached, as distinct from when containment was achieved? temporal
- What heightened monitoring period follows restoration and what would reopen the case? state
- Which residual risks remain accepted after restoration, and who accepted them? ownership
Evidence, Chronology and Record Integrity How case-related evidence is registered and held, and how the case chronology and change history are kept trustworthy.
Evidence Register and Holds
Registration, integrity and custody of evidence at the case boundary, and preservation obligations.
Evidence register entries and custody handoffs
Register of evidence items relied upon by the case with integrity values, acquiring party and custody transfers into and out of the response capability.
- Which evidence items does this case rely on and where is each physically or logically held? identity
- What integrity value was recorded at acquisition and when was it last reverified? validation
- Which custody transfers occurred, between whom, and under what authorisation? provenance
- Which handling constraints were imposed for possible legal use, and who set them? constraint
Preservation hold and retention classification
Holds that suspend routine disposal of case records and evidence, the retention class assigned, and the party that must execute disposal when the hold lifts.
- Which records and evidence are under preservation hold and who imposed the hold? retention
- What retention class and minimum period apply to the case record itself? retention
- Which case content contains personal data requiring minimisation before long-term retention? privacy
- Who authorises release of the hold and who executes the resulting disposition? ownership
Chronology and Record Provenance
Time semantics of the case and the history of who changed the record and on what basis.
Case chronology, time semantics and change history
The reconstructed sequence of the engagement with explicitly typed times, together with the log of record changes, their authors and the systems they came from.
- Which distinct time types are recorded, such as event start, detection, report, containment, recovery and record generation? temporal
- Which timestamp constitutes awareness for the purpose of starting regulatory clocks? constraint
- How are uncertain or estimated times distinguished from observed ones? quality
- Who changed the case record, when, and what was the stated reason? provenance
- From which source system did each imported element arrive, and at what ingestion time? provenance
Communication, Notification and Sharing Internal escalation and situation reporting, external and regulatory notification, affected-party communication, and control of onward disclosure.
Internal Escalation and Situation Reporting
Who inside the organisation was informed, when, through which channel, and at what reporting cadence.
Internal escalation and situation reporting
The record of internal notifications, escalation steps and periodic situation reports issued during the engagement.
- At what cadence are situation reports issued for this response tier, and to which audiences? process
- Which internal escalation steps were taken and what triggered each one? event
- Which communication channel was used, and was it out-of-band because primary systems were suspect? security
- Which internal audiences were deliberately not informed, and on what basis? access
External and Regulatory Notification
Binding of determined reporting obligations to the case, and communication to affected parties and the public.
Regulatory notification binding and submission record
For each applicable regime, the bound deadline structure, the clock start, and the record of each submission and its acknowledgement, without owning the legal determination itself.
- Which reporting regimes were determined applicable, by whom, and against which case facts? authority
- Which submission stages does the bound regime require and what is each deadline relative to the clock start? constraint
- What was submitted, to which recipient authority, and what reference was returned? evidence
- If a deadline was missed, what reasoned justification for the delay was recorded? exception
- Which mandated content elements were included, and which were still unknown at submission? requirement
Affected-party and public communication
Communication to affected individuals, customers or service recipients and any public statement, including approval and the content required for recipients to protect themselves.
- What determination triggered direct communication to affected individuals rather than authority notification alone? decision
- Which protective recommendations and contact points were given to recipients? requirement
- How were recipients reached when direct contact was disproportionate or impossible? exception
- Who approved the wording before release and which parties reviewed it? ownership
Information Sharing Controls
Handling markings and disclosure control applied to case-derived information.
Handling markings and onward disclosure control
The handling label applied to case content, its mapping to exchange-format markings, and the record of onward disclosure packages and redactions.
- Which handling label applies to this case content and how is it displayed on issued material? security
- How does the handling label map to markings in the exchange formats used, and where does the mapping break down? interoperability
- Who may share this content onward, to whom, and under what condition? access
- What was redacted or aggregated before onward sharing and who authorised it? privacy
Closure, Learning and Assurance How a case reaches a defensible end state, what is learned from it, and how response performance and record quality are evidenced.
Closure and Post-Incident Review
The end state of the case and the structured learning drawn from it.
Case status model and closure
The workflow status vocabulary of the case, closure preconditions, the final closure statement and the conditions permitting reopening.
- Which workflow statuses can the case hold and which transitions are permitted? state
- Which preconditions must be satisfied before the case may be closed? validation
- What closure outcome is recorded, such as resolved, unresolved, transferred or withdrawn? lifecycle
- Under what conditions is a closed case reopened rather than a new case being opened? exception
Post-incident review and improvement actions
The structured review of the engagement and the improvement actions it generates, each with an owner, target and verification of implementation.
- Which review was held, who participated, and what scope was agreed? process
- Which findings concern the response process rather than the underlying technical cause? quality
- Who owns each improvement action and by when must it be completed? ownership
- How is it verified that an improvement action was actually implemented and effective? validation
- Which artefacts, such as playbooks, detection rules or the charter, must be updated as a result? relationship
Assurance and Measurement
How response performance is measured and how the case record itself is validated.
Response performance measurement
Defined measures of response performance derived from typed case timestamps, with explicit definitions, windows and known data-quality limits.
- How is each response measure defined, including which timestamps bound it? measurement
- Which population of cases does a reported figure cover and over which window? temporal
- Which known data-quality limits would make a measure misleading? quality
- Which decisions may and may not be based on these measures? constraint
Case record validation and conformance claims
Completeness and consistency rules the case record must satisfy at each state gate, and how alignment to external standards is claimed with evidence rather than asserted.
- Which fields must be present before the case may move to a given status? validation
- Which cross-field consistency rules apply, such as recovery time not preceding detection time? constraint
- What evidence supports any claim of conformance to an external standard or profile? evidence
- Which validation applies when the case is exported to an exchange format, and what is lost? interoperability
Classifiers Filled
- Family
- World Models
- Category
- Activities and processes
- Entry kind
- aggregate
- Navigation path
- NAV.ACT.INC
- Domain
- ACT.INC
- Industry
- Cross-industry
- Tags
- incidentresponseact.inc
What it is Filled
This model is the response-process record: a case aggregate binding a declared incident to a mandated response capability, its triage and containment decisions, authorised actions, evidence and communication records, closure and learning outcomes. It owns the response case, not the incident entity, not the continuity or recovery plan, and not the runtime systems that execute or enforce actions. Evidence is drawn primarily from cybersecurity incident management sources; an adopting Dimension may bind a non-cyber incident model to the same case structure.
In scope
- Response capability mandate, constituency, authority level and decision rights as applied to a case
- Binding of a governing playbook, plan or procedure version to a case, and recorded deviations from it
- Case identity, alternative identifiers held by cooperating teams, and the case scope perimeter
- Triage decision record, assigned response tier and response-side clocks
- Detection and report intake, discovery source, and the event-to-incident declaration decision
- Analysis findings, hypotheses, confidence and response-side impact assessment
- Authorisation, tracking and outcome references for containment, eradication and mitigation actions
- Invocation reference and parameters for continuity or recovery plans governed by WM-ACT-043
- Evidence register entries, custody handoffs at the case boundary and preservation holds
- Case chronology distinguishing event, detection, report, containment, recovery and closure times
- Internal escalation, situation reporting, regulatory notification submissions and affected-party communication
- Handling markings and disclosure control for case-derived information
- Case closure, post-incident review, improvement actions and response performance measurement
Out of scope
- Definition, categorisation, severity taxonomy and affected-asset inventory of the incident itself (WM-ACT-020)
- Authoring, approval, testing, exercising and lifecycle of continuity or recovery plans, and RTO/RPO targets (WM-ACT-043)
- Execution, orchestration or enforcement of response actions by security tooling, and the tooling's own audit-trail semantics
- Forensic acquisition, imaging and examination methodology and expert reporting
- Statutory interpretation determining which reporting regime applies, and the regulator's own case handling
- Threat intelligence production, actor attribution and indicator curation
- Vulnerability discovery, disclosure coordination and patch management
- Risk register, risk acceptance authority and enterprise control framework ownership
- Identity, access and asset master data
- Crisis communications strategy, litigation, insurance claims and ransom payment or sanctions decisions
- Physical execution of records disposal and platform-level retention enforcement
Why it exists Filled
Provide the format-neutral context an agent needs to open, operate, inspect and close an incident response engagement from detection through containment, recovery coordination and lessons learned.
Distinguishing features Filled
- Covers the response case from detection to lessons learned, not the incident as an event, which a sibling model owns.
- Records authorised response actions and their evidence but never executes them on security or IT systems.
- Differs from a continuity plan: it invokes and references plans rather than authoring them.
- Computes notification deadlines from the recorded awareness time, distinguishing it from a generic ticket.
What robots and AI may and may not do Filled
Must not
- Record a containment, notification or disclosure entry without a recorded authorisation.
- Run containment or eradication actions directly on production systems through this model.
- Share case content beyond its handling label.
- Present hypotheses or attribution estimates as established facts.
- Alter awareness or detection times after the fact.
Only with a human decision
- Declaring an incident and setting its severity tier.
- Approving notification to regulators, affected persons or the public.
- Authorising disruptive containment such as isolating critical systems.
May
- Open a response case and record detection and report intake with timestamps.
- Propose a response tier and the governing playbook for approval.
- Attach execution evidence references and record custody handoffs.
- Compute and remind about regulatory notification deadlines from the recorded awareness time.
- Draft a lessons-learned record after closure.
Moral aspects Filled
- Delayed or incomplete notification can leave affected people unable to protect themselves.
- Case records often contain personal data of victims and staff and must follow need-to-know handling.
- Premature attribution can harm reputations of people or organisations wrongly named.
Who is affected
- People whose data or services were affected
- Responders and staff named in the case
- Regulators and partners receiving notifications
Owners Filled
Steward
The adopting Dimension must designate a single accountable owner for this model and a named response case owner role for each open case, with documented delegation when unavailable.
Roles
- Model steward
- Maintain the model, its bindings and its alignment mappings, and record divergences from external standards; Approve compatible and breaking changes and publish the migration guidance
- Response case owner
- Own an individual case end to end, including triage, decisions, escalation and closure; Ensure every decision carries an acting role and an authority basis; Request continuity or recovery plan invocation without assuming ownership of plan execution
- Records and disclosure controller
- Assign retention classes, impose and release preservation holds and approve dispositions; Approve handling labels, recipients and redactions for onward disclosure
- Notification coordinator
- Bind determined reporting obligations to the case and monitor stage deadlines; Retain submissions, acknowledgements and any reasoned justification for delay
- Interoperability maintainer
- Maintain mappings to exchange formats and external vocabularies with their catalogue versions; Report information loss and unmapped values on export rather than silently coercing them
- Post-incident reviewer
- Convene reviews, record findings about the response process and open owned improvement actions; Verify that improvement actions were implemented and assess whether they were effective
Links to other meta-models Filled
child
- WM-ACT-019 - This model is registered as a child of WM-ACT-019 and specialises it for incident response only; generic activity, case and work-record scaffolding defined by the parent is inherited rather than restated here.
composes
- WM-ACT-020 - Incoming composition: a cyber incident is handled by a response case. WM-ACT-020 owns incident identity, category, severity, affected assets and impact facts; this model carries only references to them plus response-side decisions such as declaration, tier and clocks.
- FIRST Traffic Light Protocol version 2.0 - Handling and disclosure labels are applied as a cross-cutting marking vocabulary to case content and issued artifacts, with placement rules taken from the source specification.
references
- WM-ACT-043 - Outgoing reference: the response may request invocation of a continuity or recovery plan. This model carries the plan reference, trigger, invocation parameters and acknowledgement reference only; plan authoring, approval, testing, activation state and execution remain with WM-ACT-043.
- Candidate sibling model: digital forensics and evidence examination (not yet registered) - Acquisition, examination, analysis methodology and expert reporting are referenced from the case rather than modelled here; this model retains only register entries, integrity values and custody handoffs at the case boundary.
- Candidate sibling model: regulatory obligation and jurisdiction register (not yet registered) - Determination of which reporting regime and threshold applies is a legal determination owned elsewhere; this model binds the determined obligation to the case and records submissions and acknowledgements.
- MITRE ATT&CK technique catalogue - Technique references are carried with an explicit catalogue version so that assertions remain resolvable across catalogue releases; technique definitions are not reproduced.
aligned
- IETF RFC 7970 IODEF version 2 - Alignment for case exchange: identifiers, typed times, discovery source, assessment, contact, expectation and history structures. Alignment is asserted at element level with recorded divergences and is not a conformance claim.
- OASIS CACAO Security Playbooks version 2.0 - Alignment for playbook identity, versioning and validity when binding a governing procedure to a case; workflow execution, agents and targets remain outside this model.
- OASIS STIX version 2.1 - Alignment for object identity, creation and modification markers, confidence, external references, notes and data markings when case content is exchanged as threat intelligence.
- ENISA Reference Security Incident Taxonomy - External classification vocabulary bound by coded value and taxonomy version for interoperability with CSIRT and law-enforcement reporting; the vocabulary is not forked or maintained locally.
- NIST SP 800-61r3 CSF 2.0 Community Profile - Alignment of case outcomes to cybersecurity risk-management outcomes so that response records can evidence detection, response, recovery and improvement expectations; conformance is claimed only with evidence.
neighbor
- WM-ACT-020 Cyber incident (incoming COMPOSE) - The incident model owns what happened: incident identity, classification, severity, affected assets and impact facts. This model owns how it was handled and carries only references plus response-side decisions such as priority tier and declaration.
- WM-ACT-043 Continuity and recovery plans (outgoing REFERENCE) - Plan content, approval, testing and activation lifecycle stay in the target model. This model carries only the plan reference, invocation trigger, invocation parameters and the returned acknowledgement reference.
- WM-ACT-019 registered parent activity model (CHILD) - Generic activity, case and work-record scaffolding defined by the parent is inherited, not restated; only incident-response specialisation is modelled here.
- Security orchestration and enforcement platforms - Playbook execution engines, agents, targets and command execution semantics are external. This model records the authorisation, the intended effect and a reference to execution evidence, never the execution or enforcement semantics themselves.
- Digital forensics and evidence examination (candidate sibling) - Collection, examination, analysis and expert reporting methodology are external. This model holds register entries, integrity digests and custody handoffs at the case boundary only.
- Regulatory obligation register and legal counsel - Determining which regime and threshold applies is a legal determination held elsewhere. This model binds the determined obligation to the case and records submission facts and acknowledgements.
- Threat intelligence and technique catalogues - Technique, actor and indicator definitions are external catalogue content referenced by identifier and version; this model does not curate or version them.
- Capability maturity assessment programmes - Maturity scoring and assessment methodology are external; this model records readiness preconditions and references to assessment outcomes relied upon at case time.
parent
- WM-ACT-019
What else AI and robots need to interact with it Filled
Identity and identifiers required Filled
- Identifier issued by the authoritative master system for the record, such as the case-management, work-management or evidence-management system of record in the adopting Dimension
- Governed global identifier or IRI where the record is published under a registry or exchange-format namespace, including identifiers assigned by a cooperating authority and carried as alternative identifiers
- UUID or ULID minted by the adopting Dimension when no master-system or governed identifier exists, recorded together with the minting namespace
Direct properties not applicable Not applicable
Not applicable
Institutional or informational subject: no invented physical properties.
Recognition optional Filled
- A response case has a declared incident reference, a case owner, a tier, a timeline and authorised actions.
- Often confused with the incident event itself, a service desk ticket, a continuity plan and a forensic case.
Capabilities and actions required Filled
- Open response case: Create a case aggregate for a declared or suspected incident, assign identity and bind the responding capability.
- Record detection and report intake: Register how the situation was discovered or reported, authenticate the reporter and acknowledge receipt.
- Declare incident and assign response tier: Record the declaration decision and the triage outcome, including criteria version and started clocks.
- Bind governing playbook or procedure: Attach the identity, version, validity window and integrity value of the externally governed playbook, or record ad hoc response.
- Authorise response action: Record an authorised containment, eradication or mitigation action with target, approver, intended effect and reversibility.
- Attach execution evidence reference: Link an authorised action to the executing system's record that it was performed, without importing execution or audit semantics.
- Request continuity or recovery plan invocation: Emit a referenced invocation request with case-specific parameters to the model that owns the plan, and record the acknowledgement.
- Register evidence and record custody handoff: Add an evidence item to the case register with integrity value and custodian, and record transfers at the case boundary.
- Apply or release preservation hold: Set or lift a hold that suspends routine disposal of case records and registered evidence, naming the authority and the executing party.
- Bind determined reporting obligation: Attach an externally determined reporting regime to the case, derive stage deadlines from the recorded awareness time and track submissions.
- Record notification submission: Retain the dispatched notification for a stage, its recipient authority, transmission facts and returned reference or delay justification.
- Produce marked disclosure package: Assemble case-derived material for a named recipient, apply the handling label to the material and record redactions and conditions.
- Validate case record against state gate: Evaluate completeness and cross-field consistency rules for a target status and report violations.
- Close case and issue closure statement: Verify closure preconditions, record the closure outcome and issue the final statement of handling.
- Record post-incident review and improvement actions: Capture review findings about the response process and open owned improvement actions with verification requirements.
- Compute response performance measures: Derive defined measures from typed case timestamps for a stated case population and window, with caveats attached.
- Export case to exchange format: Project the case record into an external exchange representation, applying marking mappings and reporting information loss.
Hazards and failure modes required Filled
- Missed statutory notification deadlines.
- Containment actions that cause wider outage than the incident.
- Evidence spoiled by broken chain of custody.
- Leaks of sensitive case details to attackers or the public.
Standards and interfaces required Filled
- ISO/IEC 27035 information security incident management.
- NIST SP 800-61 incident handling guide.
- STIX and TAXII for threat information exchange.
- FIRST Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) for handling labels.
- MITRE ATT&CK for technique references.
Context of use required Filled
- EU obligations are modelled from the NIS2 Directive and GDPR as adopted at Union level. National transposition varies in thresholds, reporting portals and additional sector duties, so the adopting Dimension must bind the applicable national instrument.
- As of the research date the US CIRCIA implementing rule had not been finalised, with finalisation reported as expected later in 2026. Its reporting duties are modelled as a pending, jurisdiction-specific binding rather than an operative obligation.
- US state breach notification laws and securities disclosure obligations are outside the modelled set and must be bound separately.
- Handling labels assume TLP 2.0 as published by FIRST; communities operating older TLP versions or national variants require an explicit mapping.
- The model assumes a single accountable responding capability per case. Jurisdictions or sectors mandating joint or governmental command may require an extension recorded through the parent model.
Sources Filled
- Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile (NIST SP 800-61r3) - National Institute of Standards and Technology
- RFC 7970: The Incident Object Description Exchange Format Version 2 (IODEF) - Internet Engineering Task Force
- RFC 2350: Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response (BCP 21) - Internet Engineering Task Force
- Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) Version 2.0 - Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)
- FIRST CSIRT Services Framework Version 2.1 - Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)
- CACAO Security Playbooks Version 2.0 - OASIS Open
- STIX Version 2.1 (OASIS Standard) - OASIS Open
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS 2 Directive), Articles 6 and 23 - European Parliament and Council of the European Union
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Articles 33 and 34 - European Parliament and Council of the European Union
- Reference Incident Classification Taxonomy: Task Force Status and Way Forward - European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)
- Reference Security Incident Taxonomy (RSIT), human-readable working copy - TF-CSIRT Reference Security Incident Taxonomy Working Group / ENISA
- NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery - National Institute of Standards and Technology
- NIST SP 800-86: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response - National Institute of Standards and Technology
- ISO/IEC 27035-1:2023 Information technology - Information security incident management - Part 1: Principles and process - ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27
- MITRE ATT&CK Versions of ATT&CK - The MITRE Corporation
- SIM3: Security Incident Management Maturity Model - Open CSIRT Foundation
- CIRCIA, other big cyber rules expected to get finalized this fall - Federal News Network
Open questions
- Independent second-provider or substitute-reviewer pass over WM-ACT-042 once a second provider is restored, to replace the owner-waived cross-provider comparison that this audit cannot supply.
- Reconcile the WM-ACT-020 to WM-ACT-042 edge typing: decide whether it is containment (COMPOSE) or handling reference, then settle case-to-incident cardinality and the merge, split and supersession identity rules that depend on it.
- Register the CHILD edge to WM-ACT-019 in the relationship contract, and decide whether the risk-acceptance, records-disposition and forensic-examination hand-offs named in out_of_scope require registered REFERENCE targets or remain non-model externalities.
- Add producing functions for a-analysis-note, a-deviation-record, a-restoration-verification, a-case-chronology, a-situation-report and a-affected-party-notice, which are declared artifacts with no operation that emits them.
- Enumerate sector and national reporting regimes beyond NIS2 and GDPR from primary text, including national NIS2 transpositions with their own thresholds and portals, and verify the CIRCIA implementing rule once finalised so it can move from pending binding to operative obligation.
- Obtain the ISO/IEC 27035-1:2023 normative text and extract the NIST SP 800-61r3 body so the declaration, closure and post-incident-review findings can rest on verified clauses instead of catalogue-level scope.
- Ground non-cyber, operational-technology and safety-of-life incident command structures in primary sources before the scope statement's claim that an adopting Dimension may bind a non-cyber incident model to this case structure is treated as supported.
- Define the artifact serial predicate for the Vercy artifact schema and normalise register-versus-entry naming, then re-evaluate all 18 artifacts against the stated definition.
- Model the access-control and disposition-tombstone rules that the coverage checklist currently asserts, or remove the assertion, including the five named exception paths and the deny-by-default grant model.
- The normative text of ISO/IEC 27035-1:2023 is paywalled and was not machine-verified in this session; only its catalogue-level scope and the existence of a phased process were relied upon.
- The body of NIST SP 800-61r3 could not be extracted from the published PDF in this session. Title, authors, publication date, DOI, supersession of Revision 2 and its character as a CSF 2.0 Community Profile were verified from NIST pages; internal category-level mappings were not, so no subcategory identifiers are asserted.
- Sector-specific and national reporting regimes beyond NIS2 and GDPR are not enumerated and must be bound by the adopting Dimension.
- Ransom payment decision-making, sanctions screening, cyber insurance claims and litigation hold strategy are deliberately excluded and not modelled anywhere here.
- Insider and HR-linked investigations, with their separate confidentiality and employment-law constraints, are not modelled.
- Operational technology, industrial control and safety-of-life response constraints are not covered by the cited sources.
- The full SIM3 parameter set and the ENISA taxonomy governance process were only partially verified.
- Cross-organisation coordination protocols beyond identifier exchange, such as joint command arrangements between constituencies, are not modelled.
Machine files
Provenance
world-models research · reviewable-draft
Built from: models/wm-act-042-incident-response/spec.yaml, ver-cy/world-models/card-supplements/wm-act-042-incident-response.json