← Back to catalogue
Published

Contact Point / Party Profile

vr.wm-per-010 · wm-per-010-contact-point-party-profile

Provide a reusable, format-neutral contact-profile component that any party model (person, organization, role or other party) can mix in, so that addressable channel endpoints, communication preferences and the governance of that contact data are modelled once and consistently, independently of storage format or access interface.

World Models Society, people and institutions SOC.PER.CON

Bundle → Layer → Finding → Questions Filled

9 bundles · 20 layers · 39 findings · 173 questions

Contact-point identity and party binding Establishes the contact point as a first-class, separately identified object attached to exactly one owning party, and the classification facets (endpoint kind, purpose context, capability) that determine which syntax and validation rules apply.

Record identity and ownership

Identity of the contact-point record itself and its binding to the owning or subject party, kept strictly separate from party identity.

Contact-point identifier distinct from endpoint value

A contact point is identified by a stable, non-semantic identifier assigned by the authoritative master system, not by the endpoint value it carries. JSContact assigns a mandatory uid to the Card and Id keys to each channel entry; vCard uses UID plus PID for individual property instances. Treating the endpoint value as the primary key destroys verification, validity and supersession history the moment a number or mailbox changes, and breaks when two parties legitimately share a value.

  1. Which system of record assigns the authoritative identifier for this contact point, and does that identifier remain stable when the endpoint value changes? identity
  2. Is the contact-point identifier globally resolvable, or unique only within the owning party's record? interoperability
  3. What distinguishes the contact-point record identity from the endpoint value that natural-key strategies would otherwise use? definition
  4. How are two contact-point records that normalize to the same endpoint value for the same party reconciled? constraint

Owning-party reference and mixin attachment

Defines how a contact point attaches to exactly one owning or subject party and how shared, delegated and role-based arrangements are represented, without absorbing any party identity attributes. JSContact links channels to a Card; schema.org attaches ContactPoint to Person and Organization; the W3C vCard ontology links a Kind to channels via hasTelephone, hasEmail, hasAddress and hasURL. CPOV additionally shows contact points held by an organizational function rather than a natural person.

  1. Which party does this contact point belong to, and under which identifier scheme is that party referenced? ownership
  2. Can this endpoint be shared by more than one party, and how is shared or delegated use represented? relationship
  3. Who is authorized to add, change or retire a contact point on behalf of the owning party? authority
  4. Is this contact point held for a role or function rather than for a named natural person, and how is that flagged? classification

Endpoint classification facets

The orthogonal classification axes that determine parsing, validation and intended use: addressing scheme/medium, purpose context, and technical capability.

Endpoint kind and addressing scheme

The medium and addressing scheme that select which syntax, canonicalization and validation rules apply. JSContact partitions channels into phones, emails, onlineServices and addresses; vCard into TEL, EMAIL, ADR, URL and IMPP; RFC 3986 makes the URI scheme the determinant of scheme-based normalization. Endpoint kind must be declared explicitly because a bare value string is frequently ambiguous across schemes.

  1. Which addressing scheme governs the syntax of this endpoint value, and which specification defines that scheme? classification
  2. Is the endpoint kind derivable from the value itself, or must it be declared independently of the stored value? definition
  3. Which code list is authoritative for endpoint kind, and how are emerging or unregistered channel types admitted? interoperability
  4. What happens when a value is syntactically valid under more than one scheme, such as a digit string usable as both a telephone number and a messaging handle? exception

Purpose context and channel capability

Two orthogonal facets distinct from the medium and from preference ranking: use context (JSContact contexts such as private, work, billing, delivery; vCard TYPE; schema.org contactType and contactOption) and technical capability (JSContact features such as mobile, voice, text, video, fax; vCard TEL TYPE values). Also carries service scope (schema.org areaServed, availableLanguage). Declaring a purpose states intended use only; permission to use the channel for that purpose is a consent-model decision.

  1. For which use contexts or business purposes is this endpoint intended, and are multiple contexts simultaneously applicable? classification
  2. Which technical capabilities does the endpoint support, and were those capabilities declared by the party or observed by a system? quality
  3. Does recording a purpose context here imply any permission to contact the party for that purpose? constraint
  4. Which geographic or linguistic service scope applies to this contact point? spatial
Addressable channel endpoints and value forms The typed addressable endpoint values themselves - telephone, email, web/URI and online service, and postal delivery - together with their canonical, display and URI forms and the internationalization rules that govern them.

Telephone and mailbox endpoints

The two endpoint kinds with the strictest normative syntax and the most consequential normalization pitfalls: E.164 telephone numbers and RFC 5321 mailboxes.

Telephone endpoint canonical, URI and display forms

A telephone endpoint is stored as an E.164 international number of at most 15 digits, structured as country code (1-3 digits) plus national destination code plus subscriber number, or as a local number that RFC 3966 requires to be qualified by a phone-context. The tel URI is the interoperable projection; E.123 governs the human-readable display notation. Visual separators are disregarded in comparison, so a separate canonical form must be stored alongside any display form. Extensions and dialling prefixes are carried outside the canonical digit string.

  1. Is the stored number a global E.164 number, or a local number that requires a phone-context to be unambiguous? constraint
  2. What is the canonical machine form of this telephone endpoint, and which characters are significant when two numbers are compared? validation
  3. How is the human-readable display form derived, and which notation standard governs its spacing and symbols? interoperability
  4. How are extensions, dialling prefixes and subaddresses represented without corrupting the canonical number? requirement

Email mailbox endpoint and normalization limits

An email endpoint is an RFC 5321 mailbox of the form local-part@domain. The local-part MUST be treated as case sensitive and its case preserved, while the domain follows case-insensitive DNS rules; case-folding the whole address is therefore a defect, not a normalization. Internationalized email permits UTF-8 in both local part and domain, and RFC 6530 removes any requirement for a paired all-ASCII address, so an ASCII fallback is an optional, separately sourced assertion. IDN domains must be recorded so that A-label and U-label forms remain convertible.

  1. Which portion of this mailbox may be case-folded during normalization and which portion must be preserved exactly as supplied? validation
  2. Does this mailbox contain non-ASCII characters in the local part, in the domain, or in both? classification
  3. Is an ASCII fallback address recorded, and on whose authority is it treated as equivalent to the internationalized address? exception
  4. How is the domain part recorded when both A-label and U-label forms exist for the same name? interoperability

Web, service and postal endpoints

Endpoint kinds addressed by URI or by physical delivery: web pages, online-service and messaging handles, and postal delivery points.

Web URI and online-service endpoint

Covers generic URI endpoints (web page, profile page, contact page) and online-service or messaging handles. RFC 3986 supplies the component model and the graduated comparison ladder: simple string comparison, then syntax-based normalization (case of scheme and host, percent-encoding, dot-segment removal), then scheme-based and protocol-based normalization. JSContact OnlineService allows a service name, a URI, a user handle, or a combination, because many messaging handles have no resolvable URI. Public profile URIs address the party only indirectly and carry a different exposure profile from private channels.

  1. Which URI scheme and authority identify this endpoint, and is the recorded URI absolute rather than relative? identity
  2. Which normalization steps may be applied before two URI endpoints are treated as equivalent? validation
  3. When a messaging handle is recorded without a resolvable URI, which service identifier disambiguates the handle? composition
  4. Does this endpoint address the party directly, or a publicly readable profile that third parties also observe? privacy

Postal delivery endpoint reference and delivery role

A contact point may designate a postal delivery endpoint. UPU S42 Part A defines the postal address component set and Part B the country-specific templates that render components into a correctly formatted address; that structure, its maintenance and any geocoding belong to the postal-address and place models. This model carries the reference to the addressed location, the country binding that selects the template, and the delivery-role attributes that are properties of the contact arrangement rather than of the location: attention line, care-of, and mailbox or post-office-box designation.

  1. Which addressed location does this postal contact point designate, and by which reference is that location identified? composition
  2. Which country template and postal component set govern rendition of this address for delivery? interoperability
  3. Which delivery-specific attributes belong to the contact point rather than to the location itself? definition
  4. Is the delivery point a place the party occupies, or purely a mail-receipt arrangement such as a box or forwarding agent? classification

Internationalization of endpoint values

Script, encoding, normalization and localization rules that cut across all endpoint kinds.

Script, normalization and localized forms

Endpoint values and their labels must survive non-ASCII scripts. IDNA2008 requires U-labels to be in Normalization Form C and A-labels and U-labels to be mutually convertible; RFC 6530 permits UTF-8 throughout a mailbox; RFC 6068 defines percent-encoded UTF-8 for URI carriage. JSContact separates a card-level language tag from a localizations map that applies locale-specific overrides by JSON Pointer rather than duplicating the object. UPU reports at least twenty scripts in official postal use, so transliteration authority must be recorded rather than assumed.

  1. Which Unicode normalization form is required before an endpoint value is stored or compared? validation
  2. Which language tag applies to the human-readable label for this endpoint? classification
  3. How are localized alternative forms of one endpoint recorded without creating duplicate contact points? composition
  4. Which script or transliteration variant is authoritative when a source system supplies more than one? authority
Endpoint assurance, validity and supersession The evidence and time dimensions of a contact point: what was proven about control of the endpoint, when the endpoint is valid, whether it is currently reachable, and which contact point replaces it.

Verification assertions

Assertions of proof of control over an endpoint, carried on the contact point without importing the proofing process.

Carried verification assertion for endpoint control

A contact point may carry the outcome of a proof-of-control check: which authority asserted it, which method class was used, which assurance level is claimed, when it was asserted, and when it expires. OpenID Connect defines email_verified and phone_number_verified as claims asserted by an issuing provider, which makes the asserting party a required part of the record. NIST SP 800-63A owns proofing and enrollment procedure and its assurance framing; this model therefore records the assertion and a reference to its evidence, and never the challenge issuance, evaluation logic, decision engine or proofing audit trail.

  1. Which authority asserted that the owning party controls this endpoint, and at what instant was the assertion made? provenance
  2. Which verification method class and assurance level does the assertion claim? evidence
  3. Does the assertion expire, and which events invalidate it before its stated expiry? temporal
  4. Which system executed the proofing challenge, and where is the audit record of that execution held? security

Validity, reachability and supersession

Time-bounded validity of the contact point, its derived operational reachability status, and the ordered replacement chain that links retired contact points to their successors.

Validity interval and lifecycle state

A contact point is valid over an interval and holds a lifecycle state. CPOV models contact availability and availability restriction as temporal entities; JSContact and vCard carry only created/updated and REV, so a normative valid-from/valid-to on a contact point is not supplied by the cited contact standards and is declared here as an adopting-Dimension extension rather than as a standards claim. Open-ended intervals, scheduled future changes and asserted past end dates must be distinguishable.

  1. From which instant until which instant is this contact point valid for use by the owning party? temporal
  2. Which lifecycle state does the contact point currently hold, and which state transitions are permitted from it? lifecycle
  3. Is a recorded end date an assertion of past fact or a scheduled future change, and how is a still-open interval represented? state
  4. Are there recurring windows within the validity interval during which the contact point is available or restricted? requirement

Operational reachability status

A derived, time-stamped statement of whether the endpoint currently appears reachable, together with a locator for the evidence that supports it. The underlying transmission, delivery status, failure reports and engagement records are owned by the communication/message model under SMTP and comparable transport specifications; this model carries only the summarized status, its observation instant and the evidence reference. Reachability is deliberately separated from validity: an endpoint may be valid but temporarily unreachable, or reachable but no longer valid for the party.

  1. What is the last recorded reachability status of this endpoint and at which instant was it observed? measurement
  2. Which evidence supports the recorded reachability status, and in which model is that evidence held? evidence
  3. Does an unreachable status invalidate the contact point, or only suppress its operational use? decision
  4. Who may set or override reachability status, and may it be set without an underlying observation? process

Supersession and replacement chain

When a party changes an endpoint, the old contact point is superseded rather than overwritten, so that verification assertions, historical references and inbound links remain interpretable. Supersession is an ordered, acyclic chain with an effective instant per link. No cited contact standard defines supersession for contact points - vCard offers only REV and JSContact only created/updated - so this is declared as an adopting-Dimension extension built on the identity separation those standards do provide.

  1. Which contact point replaces this one, and from which effective instant does the replacement apply? relationship
  2. Is a superseded contact point retained for historical interpretation, or disposed once the successor is active? retention
  3. How is a supersession chain traversed to obtain the currently effective endpoint for a historical reference? process
  4. What prevents a supersession cycle or a fork with two concurrent successors? constraint
Preference Declaration What the party declares about how it wishes to be contacted: the scope a statement applies to, which modalities it prefers or asks to avoid, and the linguistic and accessibility directives that shape the communication itself.

Applicability Scope and Channel Disposition

The scoping of a preference statement to a communication purpose and usage context, and the positive or negative disposition it expresses towards a channel modality.

Preference applicability scope: purpose class, context and capacity

The scope key that decides whether a preference statement applies to a given outbound or inbound interaction: the communication purpose class (for example service, administrative, scheduling, relationship or life-safety), the usage context (private or work), the party capacity in which the statement was made, and any profile-conditional flags that must be declared rather than assumed.

  1. Which communication purpose classes does this statement govern, and is the class list closed or extensible? classification
  2. Which usage context qualifies the statement, and what does an absent context mean? definition
  3. How is an inbound contact request handled when it declares no purpose class at all? exception
  4. Which capacity does the statement cover when the same party acts as customer, employee and emergency contact? relationship
  5. Which profile-conditional situations must be recorded explicitly instead of being inferred as defaults? requirement

Preferred channel modality and relative preference ordering

The party's positive disposition towards one or more channel kinds within a scope, expressed as a relative preference value that points at a channel kind or an endpoint handle owned by the channel area, never at an address. Includes the semantics of an absent preference value and whether values are comparable across different channel kinds.

  1. Which channel kinds are declared preferred within this scope, and how is the preference value expressed numerically? definition
  2. What does an absent preference value mean, and may a single valued instance be read on its own? constraint
  3. Are preference values comparable between different channel kinds, or only within the same kind? measurement
  4. Which channel-kind or endpoint reference does the statement point to, and how is a reference that no longer resolves treated? relationship

Party-stated contact-avoidance preference

An advisory request by the party to avoid a particular combination of channel, purpose, context or time. It is a local operational preference only: it carries no legal effect, is never evidence of a legal position, and can only ever narrow the set of options that other inputs already allow.

  1. Which combination of channel, purpose, context and time does the party ask to avoid, and at what precision is that combination stated? definition
  2. How is this advisory statement distinguished in data from the legally governed restriction record held in the external registry? authority
  3. Can this statement ever widen the set of permitted options relative to an external restriction? decision
  4. What firmness does the party attach to the request, and how is that recorded without implying legal weight? quality
  5. For how long does the request stay effective, and does it expire by default? temporal

Linguistic and Accessibility Directives

How a communication must be expressed to reach the party: language, script and locale preference, and functional accessibility accommodation directives that constrain which channels can satisfy the request.

Language, script and locale preference for communication

The BCP 47 tags the party prefers for interaction, ordered and optionally qualified by usage context and modality, with explicit rules for when a script subtag carries meaning and what happens when no preferred language can be honoured.

  1. Which language tags does the party prefer for written and for spoken interaction, and in what order? classification
  2. When must a script subtag be carried on a preference tag, and when should it be omitted? constraint
  3. Does the language preference differ by usage context, and how are competing per-context orders reconciled? composition
  4. What is the correct behaviour when no preferred language can be produced on the selected channel? exception
  5. Which locale formatting conventions travel with a language preference, and which stay with the rendering system? interoperability

Accessibility accommodation directive for contact

Functional directives describing how communication must be conducted or rendered for this party, expressed as required channel capabilities and adaptation directives rather than as any diagnostic or medical statement, together with the required behaviour when no available channel can satisfy a directive.

  1. Which functional accommodation directives apply to communication with this party, inbound and outbound? requirement
  2. How is the directive expressed so that it states a functional need without disclosing or implying a diagnosis? privacy
  3. Which channel capabilities must a candidate option possess before the directive counts as satisfiable? validation
  4. What must happen when no available channel can satisfy the accommodation directive? exception
  5. Which record is the authoritative source of this directive when an external accessibility profile also exists? provenance
Availability and Routing When the party asks to be contacted and in what order candidate options should be tried, including the time frame in which windows are read, urgency-driven deviation, and designation of a delegate or alternate recipient.

Temporal Frame and Contact Windows

The time-zone frame in which stated windows are interpreted, and the recurring or one-off intervals during which the party asks to be contacted or left alone.

Time-zone reference and temporal frame

The time zone in which the party's stated windows must be interpreted, preferring an IANA Time Zone Database identifier over a fixed UTC offset, together with the database release used and the distinction between a party's habitual zone and a per-statement override zone.

  1. Which time-zone identifier governs interpretation of this party's stated windows? temporal
  2. Why is a fixed UTC offset insufficient for a stated window, and in which narrow case may one still be recorded? constraint
  3. How are time-zone database releases and renamed or linked zone identifiers handled as the registry changes? lifecycle
  4. How is the party's habitual zone distinguished from a temporary zone assumed during travel? spatial

Stated contact windows and declared unavailability

The recurring or one-off intervals during which the party asks to be contacted, the disposition of time no window covers, and the representation of one-off exceptions. A stated window is a preference, not an assertion about the party's real calendar availability.

  1. Which recurring pattern expresses the party's stated contactable periods, and in which time-zone frame is it read? temporal
  2. Is time not covered by any declared window contactable or not contactable by default? decision
  3. How is a single-occurrence exception expressed without rewriting the underlying pattern? exception
  4. Does a stated window assert anything about the party's actual calendar availability at that time? definition
  5. What granularity and minimum duration make a stated window meaningful for routing? measurement

Ordering, Urgency and Delegation

How candidate options are sequenced, when an urgency tier may deviate from stated windows, and who else may be contacted on the party's behalf.

Attempt order and fallback sequence

The deterministic ordering of candidate contact options derived from preference values and scope match, the tie-break rule when values are equal or absent, and the party-stated conditions for moving on to the next option. Delivery outcomes and retry execution belong to the sending system.

  1. How is a total order derived when several candidate options carry equal or absent preference values? decision
  2. Which condition moves routing to the next option in the sequence, and which component evaluates that condition? process
  3. Has the party stated a maximum number of attempts or a minimum interval between them? constraint
  4. How does the fallback sequence change with purpose class and urgency tier? relationship

Urgency tiering and escalation preference

Which urgency tiers the profile recognises, which of the party's own stated windows or avoidance statements a tier may override, who may assert a tier, and whether any life-safety routing has been declared. No urgency tier may ever override an external communication restriction.

  1. Which urgency tiers are recognised for this profile, and against which vocabulary are they defined? classification
  2. Which of the party's own statements may an urgency tier override, and which may it never override? authority
  3. Which requesting roles are permitted to assert the highest urgency tier on an outbound request? access
  4. Has life-safety routing been declared for this party, and how is its absence interpreted? state
  5. What is the outcome when a high urgency tier meets an active external communication restriction? constraint

Delegation and alternate-contact designation

Another party designated to receive or handle communication for this party, qualified by a registered relation type, scoped by purpose class and urgency, marked as substitutive or additive, and bounded by an effective interval. The delegate's identity and the authority evidence live outside this model.

  1. Which party is designated as delegate or alternate, and by which reference into the party model? identity
  2. Which registered relation type qualifies the designation, and from which registry is it drawn? interoperability
  3. For which purpose classes and urgency tiers is the designation valid, and does it replace or supplement contacting the party? composition
  4. What authority supports the designation, and where is that evidence held? evidence
  5. When does the designation lapse, and what happens to routing already in flight at that moment? lifecycle
Validity, Precedence and Statement Provenance How long each statement holds, how temporary overrides supersede standing statements, how overlapping statements combine into one deterministic advisory outcome, and who asserted each statement under what authority.

Effective Intervals, Overrides and Precedence

The temporal validity of statements, non-destructive temporary overrides, and the deterministic precedence rules that combine local statements with the external restriction resolution status.

Effective intervals and temporary overrides

The validity interval bounding every preference statement, and the temporary override mechanism by which a short-lived statement supersedes a standing one for a bounded period without deleting or rewriting it.

  1. What effective interval bounds this statement, and what does an open-ended end mean? temporal
  2. How does a temporary override supersede a standing statement without deleting it? state
  3. Is there a maximum permitted duration for a temporary override, and what happens at expiry? lifecycle
  4. Which statement applies at an instant when several overrides are effective at once? decision
  5. How long is a superseded statement retained so that a past outcome remains explainable? retention

Precedence and conflict-resolution rules

The deterministic rules that fold matching statements, the local contact-avoidance preference and the external restriction resolution status into one advisory disposition per candidate option, including the fail-closed rule that an unresolvable external restriction reference yields an unresolved outcome rather than any permissive default.

  1. In which order are overlapping statements and external inputs combined into a single effective disposition? process
  2. Which input may only narrow the result, and which input blocks an option outright? constraint
  3. What must be returned when the external communication-restriction reference cannot be resolved at evaluation time? exception
  4. How is a genuine contradiction between two statements of equal precedence surfaced rather than silently resolved? validation
  5. Which edition of the precedence ruleset produced a given resolution, and how is that recorded on the result? provenance

Statement Provenance and Assurance

Who asserted each preference, under what authority, through which capture channel, and how statement time is separated from recording time.

Provenance, authority and assurance of a preference statement

The origin of each statement: the asserting party or authorised steward, the authority relied on, the capture channel and its assurance level, and the separate recording of the instant the party stated the preference and the instant the system recorded it.

  1. Who asserted this preference, the party or an authorised steward, and under what authority did they act? ownership
  2. Through which capture channel was the statement made, and what assurance level does that channel carry? evidence
  3. How are the instant of statement and the instant of recording represented when they differ? temporal
  4. Which statements may an operator alter on the party's behalf, and what must be recorded when they do? authority
  5. How does the advisory resolver treat a statement whose provenance or assurance is weak? quality
Authority, Stewardship and Provenance of Contact Assertions Everything that establishes who was entitled to put a contact point on a party profile, who is accountable for it afterwards, where the value came from, whether control of the endpoint was demonstrated, and which externally owned permission allows it to be used.

Assertion Authority and Stewardship

The mandate under which an agent may assert or change a contact point, and the ongoing ownership, stewardship and controller roles attached to the resulting record.

Authority to assert or change a contact point

Which agent is entitled to create, alter, suspend or retire a contact point on a party profile, on what recorded mandate, how that mandate is bounded and when it lapses. This is strictly the entitlement to write the record; it is not the entitlement to use the resulting endpoint.

  1. On what recorded mandate may an agent other than the data subject assert or change this contact point? authority
  2. How is a self-asserted change by the data subject distinguished from a steward-asserted or system-derived change? provenance
  3. Which contact-point operations does the mandate permit and which does it explicitly exclude? constraint
  4. When does the asserting mandate lapse, and what happens to in-force assertions made under it once it does? lifecycle
  5. Which external authorisation model renders the allow or deny decision, and what decision reference is retained here? decision

Ownership, stewardship and custodial roles

Which system is authoritative for a contact point, which hold non-authoritative copies, who is accountable for its quality, and which party acts as controller or processor for each purpose, including how those roles transfer without losing the prior chain of responsibility.

  1. Which system of record is authoritative for this contact point, and which systems hold non-authoritative copies? ownership
  2. Which named steward role is accountable for the accuracy and currency of this contact point? ownership
  3. Which party acts as controller and which as processor for this contact point, and does that differ by purpose? relationship
  4. How is a change of owning system or steward recorded without losing the prior chain of responsibility? provenance

Provenance of each contact-point assertion

The agent, activity and upstream source behind every asserted or derived contact value, with event time, observation time and ingestion time kept apart, so that a later reader can judge trustworthiness and reproduce the derivation.

  1. Which activity generated this contact-point value, and from what upstream entity was it derived? provenance
  2. What are the separate event time, observation time and record-ingestion time for this assertion? temporal
  3. To which responsible agent is the assertion attributed, and with what qualification? evidence
  4. What reliability grade is attached to the originating source, and how was that grade derived? quality

Endpoint Control Proof and Permission Linkage

Two deliberately separated concerns: non-secret evidence that a challenge to the endpoint was answered, and resolvable references to the externally owned consent, legal-basis and restriction records that decide whether the endpoint may lawfully be used for a purpose.

Proof that an endpoint is controlled

Evidence that a challenge sent to the endpoint was correctly answered, recorded as a non-secret verification state with method, assurance, freshness and decay. Verified control never implies permission to contact, and the exchange's secret material is never persisted here.

  1. By what method and at what assurance was control of this endpoint demonstrated? evidence
  2. When did the successful verification occur, and when does the verification state expire or require renewal? temporal
  3. What must never be persisted in this model from the verification exchange? security
  4. How are failed, abandoned or replayed verification attempts represented without leaking attempt detail? exception
  5. How is verified control kept distinct from lawful permission to contact the endpoint? constraint

Linkage to consent, legal basis and communication restrictions

How the profile points at externally owned consent records, legal-basis determinations and suppression or objection entries per purpose and channel, carrying only the reference, binding scope, validity window and subject-specific parameters.

  1. Which external consent or legal-basis record authorises use of this endpoint for a named purpose? relationship
  2. At what granularity does a permission bind: party, endpoint, channel, purpose or campaign class? composition
  3. Which restriction, objection or suppression entries currently block use of this endpoint, and who owns them? constraint
  4. How does this model detect that a referenced permission has been withdrawn, expired or superseded? event
  5. What consent detail must never be copied into this model? privacy
Lifecycle, Temporal Versioning and Data Quality How a contact point moves through its permitted states over both real-world and record time, and how its value is validated, normalised, reconciled against other sources, and degraded as staleness, reassignment or compromise signals arrive.

Lifecycle States and Temporal Versioning

The closed state set and permitted transitions for a contact point, the separation of real-world validity from record history, and the version token that makes concurrent editing safe.

Lifecycle states, effective dating and record versioning

The permitted states of a contact point and their triggers, the real-world interval over which it is asserted valid, the preserved record-time history that distinguishes a correction from a change, the opaque version token used for concurrency, and the supersession links that keep predecessors resolvable.

  1. What is the closed set of lifecycle states for a contact point, and which transitions between them are permitted? state
  2. Over what real-world interval is this contact point asserted to be valid, independent of when the record was written? temporal
  3. How is record-time history preserved when a value is corrected rather than genuinely changed? lifecycle
  4. What opaque version token identifies the current revision for optimistic concurrency? identity
  5. When one contact point supersedes another, how is the predecessor kept resolvable? relationship

Validation, Reconciliation and Decay

The checks a candidate endpoint must pass, the canonical form used for matching, the deterministic rules for merging and splitting duplicates, and the signals that erode confidence that an endpoint still reaches the intended party.

Validation, canonical normalisation and cross-source reconciliation

The syntactic and referential checks applied before an endpoint becomes active, the canonical form stored alongside the verbatim original for matching, the thresholds that decide two records denote the same endpoint, and the survivorship rules and reversal path for merges.

  1. Which syntactic and referential validations must a candidate endpoint pass before it can reach the active state? validation
  2. What canonical normalised form is stored for matching, and is the original input preserved verbatim? quality
  3. What matching rule and threshold decide that two contact points denote the same endpoint? measurement
  4. When sources conflict, which value survives and on what recorded justification? decision
  5. How can an incorrect merge be reversed without destroying either original assertion? exception

Staleness decay, endpoint reassignment and compromise handling

How age, delivery failure, jurisdictional reassignment and compromise reports reduce confidence in an endpoint, and the guarded local state changes those signals may trigger without pre-empting the incident, breach or delivery models that own the underlying cases.

  1. Which observable signals reduce confidence that an endpoint still reaches the intended party? quality
  2. At what age or consecutive-failure count must an endpoint be re-verified or suspended? measurement
  3. How is a jurisdiction-specific reassignment check recorded, including the reference date used for the query? temporal
  4. When an endpoint is reported compromised or misdirected, what immediate state change is applied here and what is delegated? exception
Protection, Disclosure, Disposition and Service Contract How sensitivity classification and minimisation limit what is held, how purpose-scoped projection and redaction limit what is released, how retention and tombstoning limit how long it survives, and the canonical, format-neutral rules for reading, adding, editing, deleting and exporting the profile.

Sensitivity, Minimisation and Purpose-Scoped Disclosure

Classification of contact points by sensitivity and safety risk, the necessity test that decides what may be held at all, and the projection, redaction and export rules that decide what any given requester sees.

Sensitivity classification and minimisation of held contact data

How a contact point is classified for sensitivity and safety risk, which purpose makes each stored field necessary, how at-risk or protected endpoints are flagged, and which attributes could reveal protected information by inference.

  1. What sensitivity classification applies to this contact point, and what drives that classification? classification
  2. Which purpose makes each stored field necessary, and which fields must be dropped when that purpose ends? requirement
  3. How is an at-risk or protected endpoint flagged so that it is never disclosed or printed by default? privacy
  4. Which contact attributes could reveal special-category or otherwise protected information by inference? privacy

Field- and purpose-scoped disclosure, redaction and export

The projection rules deciding which fields a requester may see for a stated purpose and role, how withheld values are masked, tokenised or proxied, what a subject-facing export must and must not contain, and how a partial or refused disclosure is communicated without revealing what was hidden.

  1. Which fields are released to a requester operating under a stated purpose and role? access
  2. How are withheld values represented: omitted, masked, tokenised or replaced by a proxy endpoint? security
  3. What must a subject-facing export contain, and which governance fields are excluded from it? interoperability
  4. How is a partial or refused disclosure communicated so the requester can act without learning what was hidden? exception

Retention, Erasure and Tombstoning

How long a contact point and its version history are kept, which external authority sets the period, what remains resolvable after erasure, and how conflicts between erasure and retention duties are recorded rather than silently resolved.

Retention, erasure and tombstoning of contact records

The referenced schedule and disposition authority that set the keeping period, the disposition action taken and its evidence, the tombstone left so inbound references resolve without re-exposing the endpoint, the handling of legal-hold conflicts, and the notification owed to recipients of previously disclosed values.

  1. Which retention schedule or disposition authority sets the keeping period for this contact point? retention
  2. When erasure is required, is the value destroyed, anonymised or suppressed, and what evidence of the action is kept? retention
  3. What tombstone remains after deletion so that inbound references resolve without re-exposing the endpoint? constraint
  4. How is a conflict between an erasure request and a legal hold or statutory retention duty resolved and recorded? exception
  5. Which recipients must be told of a rectification or erasure, and how is that notification evidenced? process

Canonical Service Contract and Interoperability

The format-neutral operation contract for reading, adding, editing, deleting and exporting the profile, and the declared crosswalks, conflicts and conformance limits against external contact vocabularies.

Canonical service rules for read, add, edit, delete and export

The preconditions on every write, the version token comparison that prevents lost updates, the idempotency key that makes retries safe, the atomic patch semantics for partial edits, and the audit reference every accepted mutation must return.

  1. What preconditions must hold before a write to a contact point is accepted? process
  2. How is a lost update prevented when two agents edit the same profile concurrently? constraint
  3. How is a retried create or delete recognised as the same logical request? requirement
  4. What patch semantics apply to partial edits, and how are they made all-or-nothing? process
  5. What audit reference must every accepted mutation return, and who stores the audit entry? evidence

Interoperability mappings and conformance limits

Declared crosswalks between this mixin's governed fields and external contact vocabularies, with round-trip fidelity, handling of unmapped and unknown elements, recorded semantic conflicts, and explicit limits on any conformance claim.

  1. Which external contact vocabularies are mapped, at what version, and in which direction? interoperability
  2. Which governed fields have no equivalent in the target vocabulary, and how are they carried? interoperability
  3. Where do external vocabularies disagree with this model's semantics, and how is the conflict recorded rather than hidden? constraint
  4. What evidence supports any conformance claim, and where is the relationship limited to alignment only? evidence

Classifiers Filled

Family
World Models
Category
Society, people and institutions
Entry kind
aggregate
Navigation path
NAV.SOC.PER.CON
Domain
SOC.PER.CON
Industry
Cross-industry
Tags
contactpointpartyprofilesoc.per.con

What it is Filled

WM-PER-010 models the contact profile attached to a party: the stable identity of each contact point and its binding to exactly one owning party; the typed addressable endpoint it carries (telephone, email, postal, web/URI, messaging service and comparable channels) in canonical, display and URI forms with internationalization; the purpose, context and capability facets of that endpoint; verification assertions carried on the endpoint; its validity interval, operational reachability status and supersession chain; the party's communication preferences (preferred channel and rank, language, format, reachability windows and time zone, frequency limits and topic scoping); and the governance of the profile (stewardship, provenance, correction and objection handling, access scoping, retention and disposition, and interoperability mappings). As a mixin it never asserts the identity of the party itself, never carries message content or delivery attempts, and never owns the runtime evaluation, enforcement or audit-trail semantics of the models it references.

In scope

  • Stable contact-point identity that survives change of the endpoint value it carries
  • Binding of each contact point to exactly one owning or subject party, including role-based and stewarded arrangements
  • Endpoint kind, addressing scheme, purpose/usage context and technical capability facets
  • Telephone endpoints in E.164 canonical form, tel URI form and E.123 display notation, including phone-context for local numbers and extensions
  • Email mailbox endpoints including internationalized (UTF-8) local parts and IDN domains in A-label and U-label form
  • Web/URI endpoints and online-service or messaging handles with scheme-aware normalization
  • Postal delivery endpoints as a delivery-role reference to an addressed location, with country template binding
  • Unicode normalization, script, transliteration and localized label handling for endpoint values
  • Verification assertions carried on a contact point: asserting authority, method class, assurance level, timestamps and expiry
  • Validity interval, lifecycle state, operational reachability status and supersession/replacement chains
  • Communication preferences: preferred channel and rank, preferred language and format, reachability windows and time zone, frequency limits and topic or purpose scoping
  • Governance of the profile: stewardship and ownership, provenance of each value, correction and objection handling, access scoping, retention and disposition rules
  • Interoperability mappings to vCard, JSContact, schema.org ContactPoint, public-sector contact vocabularies and postal template libraries

Out of scope

  • Identity of the party itself: legal name, birth data, registration numbers, party matching and deduplication (owned by the party/person model)
  • Message content, communication events, send/delivery attempts, bounce and engagement logs, campaign or notification execution
  • Structured postal address component modelling, address templates, geocoding, place identity and address lifecycle (owned by postal-address and place models)
  • Identity credentials, authenticators, multi-factor binding and account recovery flows
  • Execution of proofing challenges, one-time-code issuance, evaluation of verification outcomes and the audit trail of those runs
  • Consent records, lawful-basis determinations and marketing opt-in legal reasoning
  • Customer, account, subscription or contract relationships and CRM role modelling
  • Runtime policy evaluation, enforcement engines and audit-record storage
  • Telephone number allocation, portability administration, domain registration and DNS operation
  • Directory publication, search ranking and reverse lookup services

Why it exists Filled

Provide a reusable, format-neutral contact-profile component that any party model (person, organization, role or other party) can mix in, so that addressable channel endpoints, communication preferences and the governance of that contact data are modelled once and consistently, independently of storage format or access interface.

Distinguishing features Filled

  • Profiles all contact points of one party together, with preferences, availability and language directives, unlike the single-endpoint Contact Point mixin.
  • Separates proof of endpoint control from permission to use it: a verified number is not consent to call it.
  • References postal addresses, consent records and credentials owned by other models instead of copying them.
  • Excludes message content and delivery logs, which belong to the communication event model.

What robots and AI may and may not do Filled

Must not

  • Treat a verified endpoint as permission to contact the party for marketing or any other purpose.
  • Store one-time codes, challenge secrets, passwords or message bodies in the profile.
  • Disclose an unredacted endpoint to a requester whose declared purpose does not need it.
  • Merge contact points of different parties because they share a value.
  • Silently delete a contact point instead of superseding or tombstoning it.

Only with a human decision

  • Resolving a dispute over who owns or controls an endpoint.
  • Overriding a stated preference or objection for an urgent or legal communication.
  • Approving disclosure of contact data to a third party.

May

  • Normalize an endpoint value to its canonical form and record the display form beside it.
  • Resolve the current preferred endpoint for a declared purpose and explain the choice.
  • Record a verification assertion with method, assurance level and expiry.
  • Supersede an outdated contact point while keeping a resolvable link to its replacement.

Moral aspects Filled

  • Contact data lets others reach, locate and pressure a person; exposure can enable stalking, harassment and fraud.
  • Reassigned telephone numbers and mailboxes can route private messages to a stranger.
  • A party's stated preferences and objections must be honoured, not overridden by convenience of the sender.

Who is affected

  • The person or organization whose contact data is held
  • New holders of reassigned numbers or addresses
  • Senders who rely on the profile to reach the right party

Owners Filled

Steward

The adopting Dimension must name a single accountable owner for the WM-PER-010 package and a deputy identity steward, both resolvable as party references with effective intervals.

Roles

Contact Data Subject
Assert and correct their own contact points and preferences; Request export of their profile and erasure or restriction of endpoints; Exercise objection and withdrawal through the referenced consent and restriction models
Identity Steward
Verify authority mandates and their scope before privileged changes are accepted; Adjudicate reconciliation, survivorship and unmerge decisions requiring human judgement; Maintain sensitivity classifications, quality thresholds and staleness policies
Model Owner (adopting Dimension)
Maintain the owner package, required bindings to neighbouring models, purpose taxonomy and projection and export profiles; Approve breaking version changes and publish crosswalks; Clear the registry review state before adoption and keep alignment claims evidence-backed
Records and Retention Officer
Bind the retention schedule and disposition authority applicable to each channel and jurisdiction; Approve disposition runs and hold or release legal holds; Review disposition certificates and unresolved retention conflicts
Privacy Officer
Approve sensitivity classifications, minimisation decisions and disclosure profiles; Review break-glass access, bulk exports and protection-flag releases; Escalate conflicts between erasure duties and retention obligations to the deciding authority
Integrating System Operator
Operate non-authoritative copies within the declared cache validity and authority ranking; Honour projection, idempotency and concurrency rules on every operation; Propagate rectification and erasure notifications and return acknowledgements

Links to other meta-models Filled

composes

  • WM-PER-001 Person / Party identity - WM-PER-010 is mixed into the party model to supply the contact profile. It carries only a reference to the owning party plus the party-kind facet needed to select validation rules; party identifiers, names, matching and party lifecycle stay in the target.
  • WM-PER-001 Party / Person - Attach preference, availability and routing statements to a governed party identity. Party identity, naming, roles and life events remain owned by the parent model and are referenced, never restated.
  • Contact channel and endpoint descriptor area of WM-PER-010 - Preference statements bind to channel kinds and endpoint handles published by the channel area, which owns the endpoint address, its syntax, its capability metadata and its verification state. This area stores no address.
  • WM-PER-001 Person / Party - Attach governed contact points, preferences and their governance to a party without redefining party identity, names, roles or relationships, which remain owned by the parent model.
  • Postal address and location model - Compose structured postal endpoints from the address model rather than restating address structure, validation reference data or geocoding.

references

  • Postal address / place model (registry identifier unresolved) - The postal endpoint carries a reference to an addressed location plus the delivery-role parameters (attention line, care-of, box designation) and the country code that selects a template. Address component structure, template rendition, geocoding and address lifecycle remain owned by the target.
  • Communication event / message-delivery model (registry identifier unresolved) - Reachability status carries a locator for delivery or probe evidence held by the target. Message content, envelopes, delivery attempts, failure reports and engagement records are not modelled here.
  • Identity proofing and verification-process model (registry identifier unresolved) - Verification assertions carry the asserting authority, method class, assurance level, timestamps and an evidence locator. Challenge issuance, evaluation, assurance determination and the proofing audit trail remain wholly in the target.
  • Consent and legal-basis model (registry identifier unresolved) - Purpose contexts declared on an endpoint state intended use only. Permission to contact, lawful basis, withdrawal and objection outcomes are referenced from the target; neither JSContact nor schema.org ContactPoint carries consent semantics, so no local permission structure is created.
  • External communication-restriction registry (legally governed restrictions) - Carry only the resolvable reference and its resolution status as an input to the advisory resolver. The restriction record, its lifecycle, its evaluation and its enforcement stay with the registry; this model never creates, ends, weakens or interprets it, and returns unresolved when the reference cannot be resolved.
  • Consent and legal-basis model - Point at the lawfulness decision without reproducing it. A stated preference is not consent evidence and a resolved plan is never a legal-basis determination.
  • Message delivery and logging model - Identify the consumer of an advisory plan. Delivery attempts, outcomes, retries and audit trails are created, owned and retained there; this model neither writes nor mirrors them.
  • Consent and legal-basis record model (ISO/IEC TS 27560 aligned) - Carry the reference, schema version, binding scope, purpose and validity window for permission to use an endpoint. Consent capture, notice text, evidence, receipts and the withdrawal lifecycle remain owned and operated by the target.
  • Communication restriction and suppression registry model - Resolve objection, do-not-contact and jurisdictional suppression entries that block use of an endpoint. Creation, expiry and enforcement of those entries remain with the target.
  • Audit record and event log model - Retain only the audit event reference returned for each mutation and value read. Audit persistence, immutability, retention and querying remain with the target.
  • Authorisation policy decision model - Obtain and record allow or deny decision references as write preconditions. Policy authoring, evaluation and enforcement remain with the target.
  • Identity verification and credential model (NIST SP 800-63A-4 aligned) - Reference external endpoint-control verification events and assurance levels. Challenge generation, secret handling, identity proofing and credential lifecycle remain with the target.
  • Records retention schedule and disposition authority model - Resolve the retention period, disposition authority and legal-hold status governing deletion. Schedule authoring, approval and hold adjudication remain with the target.
  • Communication event and message delivery model - Consume delivery outcome and failure signals as staleness inputs. Message content, delivery execution, logs and campaign scheduling remain with the target.

aligned

  • ITU-T E.164 and IETF RFC 3966 tel URI - Alignment for the canonical telephone endpoint: 15-digit maximum, CC/NDC/SN structure, global versus local numbers, mandatory phone-context and separator-insensitive comparison. Conformance is not claimed without validation evidence per instance.
  • ITU-T E.123 notation - Alignment for the human-readable display form of telephone numbers, email addresses and web addresses, held separately from the canonical machine form.
  • IETF RFC 5321, RFC 6068, RFC 6530 and RFC 5890 - Alignment for mailbox syntax, case-sensitivity of local parts, mailto projection, internationalized email and IDNA A-label/U-label handling.
  • IETF RFC 3986 URI generic syntax - Alignment for URI component structure and the normalization/comparison ladder applied to web and online-service endpoints.
  • IETF RFC 9553 JSContact - Primary interchange alignment: Card uid, Id-keyed channel maps, contexts, features, pref, label, countryCode, language and localizations map to this model's identity, classification and internationalization elements.
  • IETF RFC 6350 vCard 4.0 and the W3C vCard Ontology - Legacy and RDF alignment for TEL, EMAIL, ADR, URL and IMPP with TYPE, PREF, PID and ALTID, and for hasTelephone, hasEmail, hasAddress and hasURL in the RDF projection. The W3C document is an Interest Group Note, not a Recommendation.
  • schema.org ContactPoint - Publication alignment for contactType, contactOption, areaServed, availableLanguage, hoursAvailable, email, telephone and faxNumber. schema.org aggregates several channels on one ContactPoint whereas this model holds one typed endpoint per contact point; the mapping is therefore one-to-many.
  • UPU S42 international postal address components and templates - Alignment for the postal component set (Part A) and country template library (Part B) that the referenced address model implements; this model aligns only its country binding and delivery-role attributes.
  • SEMIC Core Public Organisation Vocabulary ContactPoint - Public-sector alignment for contact point as a first-class class with email, telephone, contact page, opening hours and availability restriction expressed as temporal entities.
  • OpenID Connect Core 1.0 verified contact claims - Alignment for email_verified and phone_number_verified as provider-asserted claims, binding this model's verification status to an identifiable asserting authority.
  • IETF JSContact (RFC 9553) and vCard (RFC 6350) preference vocabulary - Map usage contexts, preference ordering, preferred languages, phone feature values and RELATED relation types. Alignment only; no conformance is claimed and the numeric comparison-scope rule of PREF is preserved rather than flattened.
  • IETF Calendar Availability (RFC 7953) and JSCalendar (RFC 8984) - Reuse recurring availability, occurrence override and priority-resolution semantics for stated contact windows, without adopting calendar scheduling, free/busy publication or scheduling-message workflows.
  • IANA Time Zone Database - Use registry time-zone identifiers and pinned database releases to interpret stated local windows; the zone rules themselves are never copied into this model.
  • BCP 47 / RFC 5646 language tag syntax and the IANA subtag registry - Constrain language preference values to canonical BCP 47 tags, including the Suppress-Script rule for script subtags.
  • 1EdTech / ISO-IEC 24751 AccessForAll Personal Needs and Preferences - Express accommodation directives functionally and support multiple context-specific preference sets. The full functional-ability profile and any diagnostic content remain in the accessibility or health model.
  • HL7 FHIR R5 ContactPoint (rank, period, use) - Interoperate with health-sector exchange for preference ranking, validity periods and temporary use, noting that FHIR rank orders a set while vCard PREF is comparable only within one property.
  • schema.org ContactPoint and ContactPointOption - Support publication of organisation-side contact purpose, available languages, available hours and accessibility options on the web, acknowledging that the published enumeration is far narrower than the functional directive set held here.
  • OASIS Common Alerting Protocol v1.2 urgency vocabulary - Offer a sector-neutral urgency tier vocabulary for escalation preference. CAP alert structure, dissemination and public-warning semantics are not adopted, and no CAP element grants override of an external restriction.
  • RFC 9553 JSContact - Align endpoint, context and preference semantics and carry mapping and extension parameters. JSContact remains the external normative vocabulary and is not restated here.
  • RFC 6350 vCard - Preserve legacy interchange fidelity on export, with recorded loss where bitemporal history cannot round-trip through a single revision property.
  • W3C PROV-O - Express assertion provenance using the agent, activity and entity patterns and the revision and invalidation properties, without importing a provenance store or its query semantics.

neighbor

  • WM-XCT-024 Contact Point (cross-cutting registry entry) - Unresolved potential duplicate. Both entries claim the contact-point concept. The cited vocabularies define exactly one ContactPoint/channel-object concept, so two canonical models cannot both own it; until the registry resolves this, WM-PER-010 scopes itself to the party-attached contact profile (channels plus preferences plus governance) and records the overlap as a conflict rather than freezing a relation.
  • WM-PER-001 Person / Party identity - The party model owns who the party is and its identifiers; WM-PER-010 owns how the party is reached. JSContact separates the Card (the entity) from phones, emails, onlineServices and addresses (the channels); schema.org attaches ContactPoint to Person/Organization rather than merging them. This model carries only a reference to the owning party.
  • Postal address / place model - UPU S42 Part A defines the postal address component set and Part B the country templates and rendition rules; that structure and its maintenance belong to the address/place model. WM-PER-010 carries only the delivery-role attributes (attention line, care-of, mailbox designation), the country binding and a reference to the addressed location.
  • Communication event / message-delivery model - SMTP and related transport specifications own transmission, delivery status and failure reporting. WM-PER-010 may record a derived reachability status and a reference to supporting evidence, but never the attempt log, message content, envelope or bounce record.
  • Identity proofing / verification-process model - NIST SP 800-63A owns identity proofing and enrollment procedure and its assurance levels; OpenID Connect providers assert the verified state. WM-PER-010 carries only the resulting assertion (authority, method class, assurance level, timestamps, expiry, evidence reference) and never the challenge issuance, evaluation logic or proofing audit trail.
  • Consent and legal-basis model - Neither JSContact nor schema.org ContactPoint carries consent or lawful-basis semantics; declaring a purpose context on an endpoint states intended use, not permission. Permission to contact, its legal basis, withdrawal and objection outcomes stay in the consent model, which WM-PER-010 references.
  • Customer / account relationship model - A contact point is attached to a party, not to a commercial relationship. Account-scoped or contract-scoped contact routing is a projection built by the relationship model over contact points; WM-PER-010 exposes purpose context and party binding but does not model accounts, contracts or entitlements.
  • Identity credential / authenticator model - A verified phone number or mailbox may also serve as an authenticator channel, but authenticator binding, strength and recovery are credential-model concerns. WM-PER-010 stops at proof of control over the endpoint and does not model authentication use.

parent

  • WM-PER-001

What else AI and robots need to interact with it Filled

Identity and identifiers required Filled

  • The identifier issued by the authoritative master system of record for the artifact, such as the records-management system's disposition certificate number, the verifying system's verification event identifier, or the issuing registry's crosswalk identifier.
  • A governed global identifier or IRI minted under the adopting Dimension's namespace, with an explicit authority segment and semantic version, where no master-system identifier exists.
  • A UUID (preferably UUIDv7) or ULID assigned by the adopting Dimension as a last resort, treated as opaque and never parsed for meaning.
  • No date, timestamp, endpoint value or other personal datum is ever used as an identifier; identifiers must remain stable across renames, re-issues and format migrations.

Direct properties not applicable Not applicable

Not applicable

Institutional or informational subject: no invented physical properties.

Recognition optional Filled

  • A contact profile groups typed endpoints of one party with purpose, preference, validity and verification facets.
  • Often confused with the party identity record, a postal address record and a consent record.

Capabilities and actions required Filled

  • Register contact point: Create a new contact point for an owning party, capturing the typed endpoint value, its declared kind, purpose contexts, capability features and initial validity, and assigning a stable identifier per the model identity priority.
  • Normalize endpoint value: Apply the scheme-specific canonicalization required for storage and comparison: E.164 digit form with visual separators removed for telephone numbers, case-preserving local-part handling with case-insensitive domain for mailboxes, the RFC 3986 comparison ladder for URIs, and Normalization Form C with A-label/U-label pairing for internationalized names.
  • Attach channel verification assertion: Record an externally produced proof-of-control assertion against a contact point, capturing the asserting authority, method class, claimed assurance level, event and observation instants, expiry and evidence locator. This function records an outcome; it never issues challenges, evaluates responses or determines assurance.
  • Resolve contact point to current endpoint: Dereference a contact-point identifier or a historical endpoint value to the currently effective contact point by following the supersession chain, returning the canonical endpoint value, validity state and verification status without applying any preference ranking.
  • Supersede contact point: Close the validity interval of a contact point, move it to the superseded state and create an ordered supersession link to a successor contact point with an effective instant and reason code.
  • Declare or revise a preference statement: Record a new preference, availability or routing statement for a party, or revise an existing one by supersession, with its scope, effective interval, asserter and authority.
  • Evaluate stated availability at an instant: Determine whether an instant or interval falls inside the party's stated contact windows, after applying the time-zone frame, recurrence expansion, occurrence exceptions and effective overrides.
  • Resolve an advisory contact plan: Produce an ordered advisory plan of candidate contact options for a request, by combining matching preference statements, stated availability, the local contact-avoidance preference and the resolution status of the external communication-restriction reference.
  • Resolve language and rendering directives: Select the language tag and rendering directives to use for a given candidate option, by matching the party's language preference and accommodation directives against the option's declared capabilities.
  • Explain a resolution outcome: Render a human- and agent-readable explanation of how an advisory plan or an unresolved outcome was reached, naming the statements applied, narrowed, superseded or blocking.
  • Resolve and bind assertion authority: Resolve the mandate that entitles a requester to assert or change a contact point, verify it is in force and covers the requested operation, and bind the external authorisation decision reference to the pending change. Policy evaluation itself is performed by the referenced authorisation model.
  • Assert a contact point: Register a new contact point for a party with full provenance, canonical and original values, an initial lifecycle state and an initial version token.
  • Record endpoint control verification: Record the non-secret outcome of an externally executed challenge proving control of an endpoint, together with method, assurance and freshness.
  • Bind a permission reference to a purpose and endpoint: Attach a resolvable reference to an externally owned consent or legal-basis record, scoped to a purpose, channel and validity window, without copying the target record's content.
  • Transition contact point lifecycle state: Apply a permitted state transition with effective dating, preserving prior record versions and creating supersession links where a replacement is involved.
  • Reconcile duplicate or conflicting contact points: Match candidate records under a declared rule and threshold, apply survivorship, and emit a reversible decision record that keeps every source assertion resolvable.
  • Assess endpoint staleness and compromise signals: Recompute reachability confidence from age, delivery failure, reassignment and compromise signals, and propose a guarded state change when a threshold is crossed.
  • Project a purpose-scoped view: Produce the field projection permitted for a requester's role and declared purpose, applying redaction, masking, tokenisation or proxy substitution to withheld values.
  • Export a profile package: Assemble a portable export of the party's contact profile under a named export profile, excluding internal governance fields and attaching an integrity digest.
  • Apply a governed partial edit: Apply an ordered patch to a contact point atomically under optimistic concurrency and idempotency, returning a structured problem object on rejection.
  • Dispose of or tombstone a contact record: Execute the local record action for retirement, erasure or anonymisation under an externally owned schedule, leaving a resolvable tombstone and recording the outcome.

Hazards and failure modes required Filled

  • Messages sent to a reassigned or stale endpoint reach the wrong person.
  • Over-broad disclosure of contact data enables spam, phishing or harassment.
  • Contact made against a recorded objection exposes the operator to legal penalties.

Standards and interfaces required Filled

  • ITU-T E.164 international numbering plan.
  • ITU-T E.123 notation for telephone numbers and e-mail addresses.
  • RFC 3966 tel URI.
  • RFC 6530 internationalized e-mail and RFC 5890 internationalized domain names.
  • RFC 6350 vCard and RFC 9553 JSContact.

Context of use required Filled

  • E.164 global-number form is assumed available for most telephone endpoints; closed numbering plans, short codes, emergency numbers and PBX extensions require the phone-context mechanism and are treated as local numbers.
  • Postal delivery assumes UPU member-country templates exist for the country code recorded; informal, descriptive or unaddressed locations common in some regions may have no template and will fall back to captured full text held as provenance only.
  • ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 is assumed sufficient for the postal country binding; disputed, non-listed or sub-territorial designations are not resolved by this model.
  • Internationalized email support is assumed possible but not universal; a given endpoint may be unreachable from ASCII-only infrastructure, which is a reachability fact rather than a validity fact.
  • Access defaults are stated as deny-by-default with purpose scoping; the specific legal grounds, notification duties and erasure obligations vary by jurisdiction and are deliberately delegated to the adopting Dimension and the consent model.
  • Marketing and solicitation rules, statutory quiet hours and emergency-number routing are jurisdiction-specific. They are treated as profile-conditional inputs resolved by the external restriction registry and are deliberately not encoded as schema invariants.
  • The window model assumes the Gregorian calendar and IANA time-zone identifiers; expressing windows in alternative calendar systems is not modelled.
  • A single authoritative external communication-restriction registry per Dimension is assumed. A party subject to several jurisdictions may resolve to more than one, and aggregation across multiple registries is undefined in this area and must be settled by the governance area.
  • Rules for contacting minors, vulnerable persons and people at their workplace vary by jurisdiction and sector, so they are recorded as explicit flags rather than as behaviour built into the resolver.
  • Relay and textphone service availability, and the accessibility obligations attached to them, differ by country; capability codes are carried, but no obligation is asserted.
  • EU and EEA duties (GDPR principles, rectification, erasure, objection to direct marketing, protection by design and by default) are treated as the baseline for consent linkage, minimisation and disposition.
  • US telephone-specific duties, notably reassigned-number checking keyed to the date permission was obtained, are treated as a jurisdiction-scoped overlay applied per endpoint, never as a global default.
  • UK Government Data Quality Framework dimension definitions are used as descriptive vocabulary for measurement, not as a legal requirement in any jurisdiction.
  • No assumption is made about data-localisation or cross-border transfer regimes; the adopting Dimension must bind these to its own transfer model before adoption.
  • Postal, telephone and messaging identifier formats are assumed to be normalised against international numbering and addressing standards, whose applicability varies by country and is recorded per normalisation algorithm version.

Sources Filled

  1. ITU-T Recommendation E.164: The international public telecommunication numbering plan - International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T)
  2. ITU-T Recommendation E.164 (05/97): The international public telecommunication numbering plan (ITU-hosted text) - International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T)
  3. ITU-T Recommendation E.123: Notation for national and international telephone numbers, e-mail addresses and web addresses - International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T)
  4. RFC 3966: The tel URI for Telephone Numbers - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  5. RFC 5321: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  6. RFC 6068: The 'mailto' URI Scheme - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  7. RFC 6530: Overview and Framework for Internationalized Email - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  8. RFC 5890: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  9. RFC 3986: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  10. RFC 6350: vCard Format Specification - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  11. RFC 9553: JSContact: A JSON Representation of Contact Data - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  12. Addressing Solutions: Standard S42 International postal address components and templates - Universal Postal Union (UPU)
  13. schema.org ContactPoint - Schema.org Community Group
  14. vCard Ontology - for describing People and Organizations - World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
  15. OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2 - OpenID Foundation
  16. Core Public Organisation Vocabulary (CPOV) 2.1.1 - European Commission / SEMIC (Interoperable Europe)
  17. NIST Special Publication 800-63A-4: Digital Identity Guidelines - Identity Proofing and Enrollment - National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
  18. RFC 6350: vCard Format Specification - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  19. RFC 7953: Calendar Availability: A Standard Approach - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  20. RFC 5646 (BCP 47): Tags for Identifying Languages - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  21. RFC 8984: JSCalendar: A JSON Representation of Calendar Data - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  22. ContactPointOption - Schema.org Enumeration - Schema.org Community Group
  23. FHIR Release 5: Data Types (ContactPoint) - HL7 International
  24. Time Zone Database - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
  25. vCard Elements Registries - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
  26. 1EdTech AccessForAll Personal Needs and Preferences Description for Digital Delivery Information Model - 1EdTech Consortium (formerly IMS Global Learning Consortium)
  27. Common Alerting Protocol Version 1.2 - OASIS
  28. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) - European Union / Publications Office of the European Union
  29. PROV-O: The PROV Ontology - World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
  30. Universal Electronic Records Management (ERM) Requirements - U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
  31. RFC 9110: HTTP Semantics - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  32. RFC 9457: Problem Details for HTTP APIs - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  33. RFC 6902: JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Patch - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  34. RFC 9562: Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs) - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  35. RFC 3339: Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  36. The Government Data Quality Framework - UK Government Data Quality Hub (Office for National Statistics / Cabinet Office)
  37. ISO/IEC TS 27560:2023 Privacy technologies — Consent record information structure - International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission
  38. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679 - European Data Protection Board (EDPB)
  39. Public Notice: Reassigned Numbers Database (DA-21-1649) - U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

Open questions

  • Registry adjudication of whether WM-PER-010 or WM-XCT-024 owns the contact-point concept, and whether that resolution forces a split of this aggregate into a channel/endpoint model and a separate party preference profile.
  • A verified primary source for shared and role-based organisational mailboxes and functional contact points that have no single data subject, which currently sit unresolved on the boundary with the party model.
  • A sector-neutral primary standard for party-contact urgency tiering and for an advisory, non-legal contact-avoidance construct; CAP v1.2 is an alert vocabulary carried only as an alignment candidate and cannot ground either.
  • Retrieval of ISO 19160-1, ISO 15489-1, ISO/IEC 25012 and the UPU S42 normative text through an accessible channel, to replace the indirect grounding currently carried by NARA, the UK Government Data Quality Framework and a UPU programme landing page.
  • Accessibility channel modelling beyond carried capability codes: relay services, textphone routing and sign-language video relay, including whether the resulting obligations attach to the contact profile or to the sending system.
  • Jurisdictional overlays outside the EU and US-telephone worked examples, covering marketing and solicitation restriction, statutory quiet hours, reassigned-number equivalents, and post-mortem, minor and guardianship handling of contact data.
  • Rotation and revocation semantics for device and application endpoints such as push tokens and device identifiers, which are currently admitted only through the generic online-service shape and lack distinct lifecycle rules.
  • Machine-readable retention schedule vocabularies beyond NARA's requirement groups, so that the referenced retention schedule stops being an opaque link and the disposition path becomes independently checkable.
  • No accessibility-channel modelling (relay services, textphone routing beyond the vCard textphone capability code, sign-language video relay) is developed, though schema.org contactOption and vCard TYPE hint at it.
  • Emergency-contact and next-of-kin arrangements, where the contact point reaches a different party than its subject, are only partially covered by the shared-use and care-of elements.
  • Number portability, carrier reassignment feeds and domain expiry monitoring as triggers for reachability or supersession are referenced conceptually but not modelled.
  • Device and application endpoints (push tokens, device identifiers) are admitted only via the generic online-service shape; their distinct rotation and revocation semantics are not developed.
  • ISO 19160-1 could not be retrieved (iso.org returned HTTP 403), so the address conceptual model and its address lifecycle are cited only indirectly through UPU S42.
  • Frequency capping and quiet-hour enforcement across a whole programme are not modelled; only the party's stated spacing preference is carried, and enforcement is external.
  • Organisation-side routing rotas, on-call schedules and queue assignment are not modelled; this area covers a party's stated preference, not a service desk's staffing.
  • Inbound contact handling, meaning how the party's own inbound requests are queued or triaged, is not modelled beyond stated windows.
  • Verification of a delegate's identity or mandate is referenced but not modelled; the authority record lives elsewhere.
  • No mapping table is provided from purpose classes to jurisdiction-specific marketing or solicitation categories, which would import a regional rule into a neutral schema.
  • Cost, carrier economics and channel reliability metrics that a sender might weigh alongside preference are out of scope.
  • Deceased-party, minor and guardianship handling is only partially covered by the mandate finding; jurisdiction-specific rules for post-mortem contact data were not researched.
  • No verified primary source was obtained for shared or role-based organisational mailboxes, which have no single data subject and sit at the boundary with the party model.
  • Machine-readable retention schedule vocabularies beyond NARA's requirement groups were not evaluated, so the retention schedule reference remains an opaque link.
  • The FCC public notice PDF (SRC-039) could not be text-extracted during this pass; the 47 CFR 64.1200(m) safe-harbour wording was corroborated from summaries of FCC-published material rather than re-read verbatim, so it is treated as supporting rather than load-bearing evidence.
  • ISO 15489-1 and ISO/IEC 25012 pages returned HTTP 403, so records-management and data-quality grounding rests on NARA and the UK Government Data Quality Framework instead.
  • Cross-border transfer, data-localisation and sub-processor governance are left entirely to the adopting Dimension's transfer model and are not modelled here.

Machine files

Provenance

world-models research · reviewable-draft

Built from: models/wm-per-010-contact-point-party-profile/spec.yaml, ver-cy/world-models/card-supplements/wm-per-010-contact-point-party-profile.json