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Software Product

vr.wm-sft-001 · wm-sft-001-software-product

Describe a software product in full context so an agent can identify it, know what it is made of, what rights and obligations attach to it, where it actually runs, how long it is supported, and what evidence backs every claim.

World Models Information and virtual systems INF.SFT.PRD

Bundle → Layer → Finding → Questions Filled

7 bundles · 14 layers · 30 findings · 107 questions

Identity and Classification Fixes what the product is, who is accountable for it, how it is typed, and which external coordinates denote it.

Product Identity

The stable identity of the product as an offering, independent of any single release, package or deployment.

Product Identity Record

The authoritative record that fixes the product's master-system identifier, canonical name, issuing namespace, producer of record and the criterion separating it from adjacent offerings.

  1. Which identifier is the authoritative master-system identifier for this product, and which system issued it? identity
  2. Within which namespace is the canonical product name unique, and which marketing or legacy names alias it? definition
  3. Which organization is accountable as producer or supplier of record for this product? ownership
  4. Where does this product stop, and which adjacent offerings are separate products rather than editions of this one? composition

Identifier Coordinates and Crosswalk

Ecosystem-facing coordinates that let external systems match this product and its releases (Package URL, CPE, SWID, download location, content identifiers), plus the mapping and precedence between them.

  1. What Package URL type, namespace, name and qualifiers identify the distributed form of this product? identity
  2. Which CPE names are asserted to denote this product, and who asserted them? interoperability
  3. Where two identifier schemes disagree about the product boundary, which scheme is authoritative for which use? decision
  4. How is a claimed coordinate verified against the published artifact before it is trusted? validation

Family, edition, channel and SKU

CoSWID software-meta separates product, product-family, edition, channel-type, colloquial-version and revision from the exact software-version. CSAF product trees use vendor/product/version branches, product groups and relationships among products. These group commercial variants (enterprise versus standard, OEM versus academic, LTS line) without treating each SKU as an unrelated product or collapsing them into a single version.

  1. Which product family, edition and colloquial version line does this offering belong to, and which sibling editions share the same code base? composition
  2. Which distribution or licensing channel (OEM, academic, retail, volume or other) applies to this offering? classification
  3. Which CSAF product group, if any, collects this product with related products for common advisory or remediation status? relationship

Classification and Stewardship

How the product is typed and what purpose it serves, and who is entitled to speak for each slice of its record.

Software Classification and Purpose

Controlled typing of the software (component type, primary and additional purpose, delivery model, regulatory class) that determines which downstream profiles and obligations apply.

  1. Which component type from the governing BOM vocabulary applies to this product? classification
  2. What primary purpose and additional purposes does the released artifact serve? definition
  3. Is the product delivered as an installable artifact, an appliance image, or a hosted service, and does that change which BOM type applies? interoperability
  4. Is the product classified as important or critical under an applicable product-security regime? requirement

Producer Accountability and Record Stewardship

The split of ownership and authority over the record: producer-side release facts versus operator-side deployment facts, who may publish binding statements, and what happens when stewardship lapses.

  1. Which role owns each slice of this record: producer, supplier, distributor or operator? ownership
  2. Who is authorised to publish a binding statement about this product, and under what delegation? authority
  3. Is the author of a given record the same party as the software producer, and how is the difference recorded? provenance
  4. What becomes of stewardship if the producing organization is acquired, dissolved or abandons the product? exception
Release and Distribution The published version lineage of the product and the channels, conditions and cryptographic evidence under which each release reaches a consumer.

Release Lineage

Individual published releases, their version strings, states, publication events and the scheme that makes versions comparable.

Release Record

One published version of the product: its version string, publication event time and observation time, distribution channel, state and supersession links.

  1. What exact version string identifies this release, and is that string immutable once published? identity
  2. When was the release published, and is that time distinct from when this record observed it? temporal
  3. What is the release's current state: pre-release, generally available, superseded, withdrawn or yanked? state
  4. Which event withdrew or re-published this release, and what release replaced it? event

Version Scheme and Ordering

The declared versioning scheme and precedence rules that make version comparison, dependency ranges and affected-range statements decidable rather than guessed.

  1. Which versioning scheme governs this product line, and is it declared by the producer or inferred by a consumer? classification
  2. How is precedence determined between two versions, including pre-release identifiers and build metadata? constraint
  3. What change classes force a major increment, and what compatibility promise attaches to minor and patch increments? requirement

Patch versus upgrade and tag types

CoSWID and NISTIR 8060 define four tag types used at different lifecycle points: corpus (pre-install media), primary (installed component), patch (incremental fix that MUST NOT change software-version) and supplemental (site-added metadata). Patch tags MUST link with rel=patches to the patched software. Upgrade replaces primary tags and changes version metadata. This distinction is a frequent omission in product catalogues that only store version strings.

  1. Is the current identification record a corpus, primary, patch or supplemental tag, and where is it supposed to reside (media versus endpoint versus operator overlay)? state
  2. If this is a patch, which release does it patch, and does the patch illegally change the software-version? relationship
  3. If this is a pre-install corpus record, which installation media or package installer does it describe? process

Distribution and Integrity

Where a release may legitimately be obtained, under what access conditions, and the cryptographic evidence that a fetched artifact is the released artifact.

Distribution Channel and Availability

Authoritative download locations and registries for a release, the access conditions attached to them, and how long prior releases stay retrievable.

  1. From which authoritative download locations or registries is this release distributed? provenance
  2. What access conditions apply to obtaining this release: public, entitled, embargoed or jurisdictionally restricted? access
  3. How long are prior releases retained at the distribution point, and what is the removal policy? retention

Artifact Integrity and Signature

Hashes, signatures and signing identities that let a consumer verify a fetched artifact, together with the verification outcome and any reproducibility claim.

  1. Which hash algorithms and digest values are published for each distributable artifact of this release? evidence
  2. Which signing identity signed the release, and how is that identity's authority established? security
  3. What verification procedure must a consumer run before accepting the artifact, and what does a failure trigger? validation
  4. Is the build reproducible, such that an independent rebuild yields a bit-identical digest? quality
Composition and Supply Chain What the release is made of as declared in a bill of materials, how declared dependencies were resolved, and what provenance and development-practice evidence stands behind the build.

Declared Composition

The bill of materials as a governed document about a release, and the dependency constraints and resolutions it records.

Bill of Materials Document

The SBOM treated as a dated, authored document about one release: its format and specification version, author, creation time, declared depth and explicitly declared known unknowns.

  1. Who authored this bill of materials, and is that party the same as the software producer? provenance
  2. What depth does this bill of materials claim: top level only, direct dependencies, or complete transitive closure? measurement
  3. Which parts of the composition are declared known unknowns rather than silently omitted? quality
  4. Which bill-of-materials format and specification version does the document conform to, and was that conformance verified? interoperability

Dependency Graph and Resolution

Declared dependency constraints with scope and optionality, the concrete releases that satisfied them at build time, and the pinning that makes the resolution reproducible.

  1. What constraint range and scope does the release declare for each dependency? composition
  2. Which concrete component release satisfied each constraint at build time, and which resolver produced that resolution? relationship
  3. How is a later re-resolution distinguished from the resolution recorded at build time? temporal
  4. Is the resolved dependency set pinned by a lockfile or digest so that the build can be reproduced? validation

Coverage, completeness and known unknowns

CISA 2026 replaces NTIA Depth with Coverage (horizontal and vertical breadth) and requires explicitly identifying unknown information. CycloneDX compositions aggregate completeness as complete, incomplete, incomplete first-party only, incomplete third-party only or unknown. SPDX Sbom may carry multiple sbomTypes. An SBOM that omits unknowns is less operable than one that marks them. Completeness is a quality measurement of the composition evidence, not of the software.

  1. What completeness aggregate applies to this composition, and is first-party or third-party content incomplete? measurement
  2. Which component, dependency, license or identifier fields are explicitly unknown rather than omitted? evidence
  3. What horizontal and vertical coverage does the producer claim relative to CISA 2026 Coverage, and what is out of that claim? constraint

Build Provenance and Development Assurance

Verifiable statements about what built the release from which inputs, and about the producer's secure development practices.

Build Provenance Attestation

Machine-verifiable provenance identifying the build platform and builder, the top-level inputs and source revision, the parameters used, and the build-integrity level the provenance supports.

  1. Which build platform and builder identity produced this release? provenance
  2. What top-level inputs, parameters and source revision entered the build? process
  3. What build-integrity level does the provenance support, and who verified that claim? evidence
  4. How is the provenance protected from forgery by the tenant whose build it describes? security

Secure Development Practice Assurance

Claims about the producer's secure development practices, the evidence for each claim, and whether the claim is self-attested, customer-audited or third-party assessed.

  1. Which secure development framework practices does the producer claim, and over what organizational and product scope? requirement
  2. What evidence substantiates each claimed practice, and who attested to it? evidence
  3. Is each claim self-attested, customer-audited or assessed by an independent third party? authority
Rights and Licensing The licence under which a release is offered, the obligations inherited from third-party components, and the restrictions on who may use, receive or re-export it.

Licence Identification

What licence applies to a release, how it was determined, and who may change it.

Licence Declaration and Expression

The licence expression applying to a release, distinguishing what the producer declared from what an analyst concluded, with the copyright holder and any licence change across releases.

  1. What licence expression applies to this release as a whole, and in which expression syntax is it written? definition
  2. Where do the declared and the concluded licences differ, and on what evidence was the conclusion drawn? evidence
  3. Who holds copyright in the product and who is empowered to relicense it? ownership
  4. Has the licence changed between releases, and does the change apply retroactively to prior releases? lifecycle

Obligations and Restrictions

What the product must ship or make available because of what it contains, and who may lawfully receive and use it.

Third-Party Attribution Obligations

Obligations inherited from bundled third-party components: attribution notices that must ship, reciprocal obligations and their reach, and corresponding-source availability duties with their duration.

  1. Which attribution notices must ship with the product, and in what form must they be delivered? requirement
  2. Which contained components impose reciprocal obligations, and how far do those obligations reach into the product? constraint
  3. Where is corresponding source made available for components that require it, and for how long must it stay available? retention

Use and Export Restrictions

Restrictions on who may obtain, run or re-export the product, including entitlement requirements, field-of-use exclusions, jurisdictional controls and documented waivers.

  1. What entitlement is required to obtain and run this release lawfully? access
  2. Which fields of use or deployment contexts are excluded by licence, contract or regulation? constraint
  3. Which export-control or sanctions classifications apply to this release, and who determined them? authority
  4. Under what documented exception may a restriction be waived, and who approves the waiver? exception
Deployment and Operation Where releases actually run: deployed instances, their hosting environments, the configuration in effect and the interfaces they expose or consume.

Deployed System Inventory

Concrete running installations and the environments that host them.

Deployed Instance Record

One running installation of a specific release: its operator-side identifier, the version observed running, the window over which it ran, its purpose and its criticality.

  1. Which identifier denotes this deployed instance in the operator's authoritative inventory? identity
  2. Which release is actually running on this instance, as observed rather than as intended? state
  3. Over which time window did this instance run this release, with event time and observation time recorded separately? temporal
  4. What business criticality and exposure does this instance carry? measurement

Hosting Environment and Platform

The environment class, platform stack, jurisdictional location and network exposure of the host on which instances run.

  1. Which environment class does this host: development, test, staging, production or disaster recovery? classification
  2. What platform, operating system and runtime constitute the hosting stack for this instance? composition
  3. In which jurisdiction and region does hosting occur, and does that location constrain what may be processed there? spatial
  4. Is this instance reachable from the public internet, and through which controlled boundary? security

Runtime Configuration and Interfaces

What the deployed software is actually doing: effective configuration and drift, and the external services and data flows it touches.

Effective Configuration State

The configuration actually in effect on an instance, its deviation from the released default or hardened baseline, and the change events that produced it. This matters because exploitability assessments are frequently conditional on configuration.

  1. Which security-relevant configuration values are actually in effect on this instance, and when were they last observed? state
  2. How does the effective configuration differ from the release default or the hardened baseline? validation
  3. Which change event last altered this configuration, and who authorised it? event

External Interfaces and Data Flows

Services, endpoints and data flows a deployed instance exposes or consumes, including third-party services that are dependencies but never shipped as components.

  1. Which external services does this instance call, and are they recorded as services rather than as shipped components? composition
  2. What categories of data cross each interface, and is any of it personal or otherwise regulated? privacy
  3. How is each interface authenticated and authorised, and where are its credentials held? access
Lifecycle, Support and Security Response How long the product is maintained, how fixes are delivered, and how published vulnerabilities are mapped to versions, instances and exploitability judgements.

Support Lifecycle

Support status, end-of-life milestones and the mechanics by which fixes reach deployed instances.

Support Status and End of Life

The producer's binding statement about how long a product line or release receives fixes, the dated milestones that end that obligation, and what happens to instances that outlive it.

  1. What support status applies to this release line today, and who set it? state
  2. What are the announced end-of-support and end-of-life dates, and when were they announced? temporal
  3. Does the declared support period satisfy the applicable regulatory minimum for the expected product lifetime? requirement
  4. What happens to deployed instances that remain in service after end of support, and who accepts the residual risk? exception

Update and Patch Delivery

How fixes reach deployed instances: channels, mechanism, default automation, separability of security fixes from feature change, and evidence that an update was actually applied.

  1. By what mechanism are security updates delivered, and are they applied automatically by default? process
  2. Are security fixes separable from feature changes so that an operator can apply one without the other? requirement
  3. What record proves that a given instance received and applied a given update? evidence

Vulnerability and Advisory

Published notices affecting the product and the product-specific judgement of whether a contained vulnerability is actually exploitable.

Advisory and Exposure Mapping

Notices of defects or vulnerabilities and the mapping from each notice to affected version ranges, contained components and deployed instances, with severity and any authority-reporting duty.

  1. Which advisory and vulnerability identifiers apply, who published them, and at which tracking version? provenance
  2. Which version ranges of this product are declared affected, fixed, or under investigation? relationship
  3. What severity or exploitability scores are asserted, by which scoring system and which scoring party? measurement
  4. When must an actively exploited vulnerability in this product be reported, and to which authority? requirement

Exploitability Assessment

The product-specific determination of whether a vulnerability present in a contained component is actually exploitable in this product or deployment, with a recognised justification and its conditions.

  1. What is this product's status for the vulnerability: affected, not affected, fixed, or under investigation? state
  2. If the product is not affected, which recognised justification applies and what evidence supports it? evidence
  3. Does the assessment hold for all deployments, or only under stated configuration or environment conditions? constraint
  4. What triggers re-assessment, and how is a superseded assessment retained? lifecycle

Remediation, entitlements and restart

CSAF remediations carry category, date, details, product or group ids, URL, restart-required and entitlements. Entitlements here are access gates on a remediation (who may obtain the fix), not the intellectual-property license of the software. CoSWID activation-status and entitlement-key similarly record install-time activation without storing unprotected license secrets. Restart-required is an operational constraint on deployed systems.

  1. What remediation category and URL are offered for the affected products, and on which date was that remediation published? process
  2. Does applying the remediation require a restart, and of what kind? constraint
  3. Which entitlements gate access to the fix, and what activation status applies to the installed product? access
Quality, Conformance and Regulatory What quality the product is specified and measured against, what verification evidence exists, and what regulatory documentation must be produced and retained to place it on a market.

Quality and Verification

Specified quality characteristics with their measures, and the evidence that a release was verified against them.

Quality Characteristics and Measures

The quality characteristics selected for this product from a governed quality model, the measure and target defined for each, and the values actually measured on a named release.

  1. Which quality model and which of its characteristics are used to specify this product's quality requirements? classification
  2. What measure, measurement method and target value are defined for each selected characteristic? measurement
  3. What values were actually measured, on which release, and under which stated conditions? quality

Verification and Test Evidence

Evidence that a release was verified: which activities were performed, how each result binds to the exact artifact digest tested, and which defects were knowingly accepted at release.

  1. Which verification activities were performed against this release, and by whom? process
  2. How is each verification result bound to the exact artifact digest it was run against? validation
  3. Which known defects were accepted as open at release, and who accepted the residual risk? decision

Regulatory Conformity

Which market regimes apply, which conformity route was taken, and what documentation must exist and be retained.

Conformity Assessment and Technical Documentation

The regulatory regimes in scope for placing the product on each target market, the conformity assessment route used, the declaration or marking issued, and the technical documentation with its retention duty.

  1. Which product-regulation regimes apply to this product in each target market, and from which date? requirement
  2. Which conformity assessment route was used, and who performed the assessment? authority
  3. What technical documentation must exist, and for how long must it be retained after the product is placed on the market? retention
  4. What declaration of conformity or marking is issued, and against exactly which release does it hold? evidence

Classifiers Filled

Family
World Models
Category
Information and virtual systems
Entry kind
aggregate
Navigation path
NAV.INF.SFT.PRD
Domain
INF.SFT.PRD
Industry
Cross-industry
Tags
softwareproductinf.sft.prd
Also called
N4

What it is Filled

This model is the host aggregate for software regarded simultaneously as a published offering (product line, releases, distributable artifacts, licences) and as an operated system (deployed instances, environments, effective configuration, advisories). It is an aggregate rather than a plain entity because release, deployment and advisory records have independent lifecycles yet are only meaningful when anchored to one product identity. It is format-neutral: SPDX, CycloneDX, CSAF, JSON, Git, MongoDB and MCP are projections of these findings, not their semantics. Component-internal and package-ecosystem detail is delegated to WM-SFT-007 by COMPOSE and is not restated here.

In scope

  • Product identity, classification, producer accountability and identifier coordinates (purl, CPE, SWID, content identifiers)
  • Release lineage: version strings, versioning scheme, publication events, channels, withdrawal and supersession
  • Product-level composition: the bill of materials document, declared dependency constraints and their recorded resolution
  • Build provenance, artifact integrity, signatures and secure-development assurance claims
  • Licence declaration, third-party attribution obligations, use and export restrictions
  • Deployed instances, hosting environments, effective configuration and exposed interfaces
  • Support lifecycle, end-of-life milestones, update delivery, advisories and exploitability assessment
  • Quality characteristics, verification evidence and regulatory conformity documentation

Out of scope

  • Internal structure, ecosystem metadata and package-manager semantics of individual components and packages (WM-SFT-007)
  • Organization records for producers, suppliers and operators beyond a reference to them
  • Rights-holder, patent and trademark records as subject matter in their own right
  • Dataset and AI training-corpus records consumed or produced by the software
  • Source-control history, issue tracking, requirements engineering and project management processes
  • Vulnerability records themselves as governed objects (CVE/CWE registry content), as opposed to this product's exposure to them
  • Hardware devices and physical assets except as the hosting platform of a deployed instance
  • Commercial contracts, pricing and entitlement fulfilment mechanics

Why it exists Filled

Describe a software product in full context so an agent can identify it, know what it is made of, what rights and obligations attach to it, where it actually runs, how long it is supported, and what evidence backs every claim.

Distinguishing features Filled

  • A software product is the offering a producer names and supports, unlike its components and packages (WM-SFT-007).
  • It differs from a hosted service, which is an operated offering rather than delivered software.
  • Releases, deployments and bills of material are linked records, with producer and operator stewardship kept apart.
  • Unknown components are stated as known unknowns, not left out.

What robots and AI may and may not do Filled

Must not

  • Merge producer statements with third-party observations into one claim.
  • Claim SBOM completeness or conformance without evidence.
  • Store secrets or personal data from configuration snapshots.
  • Publish operator inventory or deployment locations in public catalogs.
  • Install or run a release whose integrity check failed.

Only with a human decision

  • Declaring end of support or withdrawing a release.
  • Publishing a security advisory.
  • Accepting the risk of running a vulnerable version.

May

  • Register a product and its releases with identifiers and integrity values.
  • Attach an SBOM and check it against declared releases.
  • Assess deployments against vulnerability advisories and report exposure.
  • Record end-of-support dates published by the producer.

Moral aspects Filled

  • Unpatched software puts users and their data at risk; vulnerability information must reach those who can act.
  • Disclosing vulnerabilities too early can enable attacks; coordinated disclosure balances this.
  • End of support can strand users, especially public services and small organizations.

Who is affected

  • Users of the software
  • Operators and administrators
  • People whose data the software processes

Owners Filled

Steward

The adopting Dimension must nominate a producer-side owner package for identity, classification, release, licensing, composition and provenance records, and a separate operator-side owner package for deployment, environment, effective-configuration and interface records; a single package owning both is a governance failure because it lets producer intent silently overwrite operational observation.

Roles

Product Steward (producer side)
Owns the product identity record, namespace, canonical naming and classification assignments; Approves supersession of identity and classification statements and maintains the stewardship assignment
Release Engineer
Creates release records with publication event times, integrity values and distribution registrations; Maintains the version scheme declaration and the dependency resolution records for each build; Attaches bills of materials and build provenance attestations to the releases they describe
Deployment Operator
Owns deployment inventory entries, environment profiles, configuration snapshots and interface registers; Records observations with method and time and grants or refuses read access to operator-scoped findings; Applies updates and records application evidence per instance
Security Response Owner
Maps advisories to affected releases and instances and publishes exploitability statements with justifications; Holds time-boxed cross-operator read access during an active advisory and submits authority reports where required; Triggers re-assessment when new evidence arrives and retains superseded statements
Licensing and Compliance Officer
Maintains licence declarations, determination basis, attribution notice sets and the restriction register; Compiles technical documentation dossiers and enforces statutory retention floors against deletion schedules; Approves disclosures of bills of materials and dossiers outside the Dimension and records the legal or contractual basis
Model Custodian
Maintains the AGENTS.md bootstrap contract, projection mappings and pinned external specification versions; Runs canonicalization, patch and compatibility rules and blocks breaking changes without a major model version

Links to other meta-models Filled

composes

  • WM-SFT-007 Software Component and Package - Product releases are composed of components and packages whose own identity, ecosystem metadata and internal files are modelled there. This model holds the composition relation, the declared constraint and the recorded resolution; it does not restate component internals.

references

  • Organization model (producer, supplier, distributor, operator) - Producer, supplier, SBOM author, advisory publisher and deployment operator are all party references. Candidate sibling, not confirmed in the registry relations; recorded as a reference obligation rather than an assumed link.
  • Intellectual property and rights model - Copyright holders, relicensing authority and the underlying rights instruments behind a licence expression live outside this model; only the expression, its determination basis and a holder reference are held here.
  • Identifier and naming scheme model - Governance of purl types, the CPE dictionary and tag-issuer rules belongs to the identifier model; this model records which coordinates denote the product and how scheme conflicts are resolved per use.
  • Dataset model - Datasets consumed or produced by the software, including training data for AI-enabled products, are referenced rather than described. SPDX carries a separate Dataset profile for exactly this separation.
  • Vulnerability record model (CVE Program record format) - Vulnerability records, weakness classifications and scoring vectors are governed externally; this model references the identifier and holds only the product's exposure and exploitability judgement.

extends

  • AI system and model model - Where the product is AI-enabled, model cards, training provenance and model-specific evaluation extend this model rather than duplicating into it; both SPDX and CycloneDX treat this as a separate profile or object.

aligned

  • SPDX Specification 3.0.1 - Alignment for element identity, artifact and package structure, relationships, creation information, integrity methods, external identifiers and the Software, Security, Licensing and Build profiles. Alignment only; no conformance is claimed without a cited conformance artifact.
  • CycloneDX v1.6 (ECMA-424) - Alignment for BOM metadata, component typing, services, dependency graph, compositions, lifecycle phases, formulation and declarations. Component-versus-package granularity differs from SPDX and is recorded as a conflict rather than harmonised silently.
  • ECMA-427 Package-URL (PURL) - Alignment for the governed global coordinate used to identify the distributed form of a release across ecosystems; purl is a coordinate, never the master key.
  • OASIS CSAF v2.0 including the VEX profile - Alignment for advisory tracking, product trees with identification helpers, product status vocabularies, remediations, scores and threats used by the advisory and exploitability findings.
  • ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2026 and ISO/IEC 25010:2023 - Alignment for life cycle stage vocabulary (acquisition, supply, development, operation, maintenance, disposal) and for the product quality characteristics used to specify and measure quality. Full texts are paywalled, so alignment is at catalogue-scope level and flagged as an evidence gap.

neighbor

  • WM-SFT-007 Software Component and Package - This model records that a release is composed of components and the resolution that satisfied each declared dependency; it does not model a component's own identity, ecosystem metadata or internal files. SPDX distinguishes the Sbom/Bom collection from the Package and File elements it contains, and CycloneDX separates the BOM document from the component objects; the seam is drawn at that same line.
  • Organization model (producer, supplier, distributor, operator) - SPDX models Agent, Person and Organization as first-class elements referenced by artifacts. This model holds only the reference plus the role that party plays for this product; legal identity, addresses and corporate hierarchy belong to the organization model.
  • Vulnerability registry (CVE Program) and advisory publishers - CVE records and CVSS scores are governed by the CVE Program and its record format. This model stores the exposure mapping and the product's exploitability assessment, referencing the CVE identifier rather than restating the vulnerability record.
  • Intellectual property and rights model - The licence expression, copyright holder reference and obligation classes attached to a release are in scope; the underlying rights instruments, assignments and disputes are not.
  • Identifier and naming scheme model - purl types, CPE dictionary governance and SWID tag-issuer rules are governed elsewhere. This model records which coordinates denote this product and how conflicts between schemes are resolved for a given use.
  • Service and hosted-offering model - CycloneDX separates components from services and supports a SaaSBOM. Where software is delivered only as a hosted service with no distributable artifact, the release and integrity layers degrade to service-version records; that degradation is recorded explicitly rather than by forcing artifact semantics.
  • Software life cycle process model - ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 defines processes for acquiring, supplying, developing, operating, maintaining and disposing of software. This model describes the product and system as objects with states and evidence; it does not define or govern the processes themselves.

What else AI and robots need to interact with it Filled

Identity and identifiers required Filled

  • Authoritative master-system identifier issued by the system of record that owns the artifact class — the producer's product or release key for producer-side artifacts, and the operator's inventory identifier for deployment-side artifacts — always stored together with the issuing system so its authority can be checked.
  • Governed global identifier or IRI where a recognised scheme exists: an SPDX element IRI, a Package URL per ECMA-427, a CPE name from the NVD dictionary, a SWID tag identifier, a CVE or advisory tracking identifier, or a content digest for a binary artifact.
  • UUID or ULID minted by the adopting Dimension when neither of the above exists, recorded explicitly as Dimension-assigned and never later presented as authoritative.
  • A version string, release date, build date, hostname, environment name or file path is never an identifier; version strings and dates are attributes that may participate in a composite key only alongside a tier-one or tier-two identifier.

Direct properties not applicable Not applicable

Not applicable

Institutional or informational subject: no invented physical properties.

Recognition optional Filled

  • A software product is identified by producer, product name, version and identifiers such as CPE, purl or SWID tags.
  • Confused with a component library, a package in a registry, a hosted service of the same name and a single build artifact.

Capabilities and actions required Filled

  • Register software product: Create the product identity record, binding a master-system identifier, namespace, canonical name and producer reference before any release, licence or deployment statement may attach to it.
  • Publish release: Record a published version of the product with its publication event time, observation time, channel, state and at least one integrity value.
  • Attach bill of materials: Associate a versioned, authored bill-of-materials document with a specific release, recording format, specification version, author, creation time, declared depth and known unknowns.
  • Verify artifact integrity: Check a fetched artifact against its published digests, signatures and provenance attestation, and record the verification outcome with the verifier identity and time.
  • Resolve dependency set: Evaluate declared dependency constraints against available component releases, record the concrete resolution with resolver identity and lock digest, and preserve the build-time resolution distinctly from any later re-resolution.
  • Record deployment observation: Record that a specific instance was observed running a specific release in a specific environment, with the observation method and time kept separate from the go-live event time.
  • Assess vulnerability exposure: Map an advisory to affected releases through the bill of materials, then to deployed instances, then record a product-specific exploitability status with a recognised justification and its applicability conditions.
  • Declare end of support: Publish or revise a lifecycle statement setting support status and end-of-support or end-of-life milestones for a product or release line, and test the declared period against applicable regulatory minimums.
  • Compile conformity dossier: Assemble the technical documentation required by an applicable market regime from identity, composition, provenance, verification, licensing and lifecycle findings, and place it under the regime's retention duty.
  • Revise identification tag: Increment tag-version to correct metadata without changing software-version.
  • Apply patch tag: Install a patch tag linked with rel=patches that must not change software-version, or perform an upgrade that replaces primary tags.
  • Withdraw or yank release: Mark a published version withdrawn or yanked while retaining historical identity for exposure analysis.
  • Issue advisory: Publish a CSAF document with tracking identity, publisher authority, TLP and product tree.
  • Disclose SBOM or inventory: Share a catalogue, SBOM or operator inventory under TLP, contractual and access-scope rules, auditing disclosure separately from public product pages.
  • Retire deployment: Decommission a deployed system and remove corresponding primary, patch and supplemental tags per the SWID/CoSWID lifecycle.

Hazards and failure modes required Filled

  • Compromised releases spread malware through the supply chain.
  • Undetected vulnerable components leave deployments exposed.
  • Wrong version mapping hides or overstates exposure.

Standards and interfaces required Filled

  • CycloneDX bill of materials standard (ECMA-424).
  • OASIS CSAF 2.0 security advisories.
  • ISO/IEC 19770-2 software identification tags.
  • Package URL (purl) and NIST CPE naming.

Context of use required Filled

  • The regulatory conformity bundle is grounded in EU legislation (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847), with reporting obligations from 2026-09-11 and main application from 2027-12-11. Products not placed on the EU market will have different or no equivalents, and other regimes are not modelled.
  • The SBOM minimum elements source is US-led guidance developed with international partners; it is authoritative for US federal contexts and influential elsewhere, but it is not binding law in most jurisdictions.
  • The CPE dictionary and the CVE Program are US-operated registries. Regional vulnerability databases exist with different identifiers and different affected-range conventions, and a product may carry identifiers in several of them simultaneously.
  • Export-control and sanctions classifications are jurisdiction-specific and change without notice; the restriction register is scoped per jurisdiction with effective windows for this reason.
  • ISO and IEC standards are paywalled, so alignment claims to ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2026 and ISO/IEC 25010:2023 rest on catalogue-level scope statements rather than clause-level reading. This is an evidence limitation, not a conformance claim.
  • CISA 2026 minimum elements and NIST SWID guidance are US-origin instruments adopted with international partners; they are not global law.
  • CPE and NVD matching are US NIST operational practice; other jurisdictions may prefer PURL/OSV matching.
  • CSAF has strong European implementation (BSI co-editorship) and TLP-based distribution that may differ from US federal sharing rules.
  • EU CRA and BSI TR-03183 may impose stricter SBOM field and format constraints on products placed on the EU market than CISA 2026.
  • UNSPSC classification on CoSWID is optional and not universally used outside procurement contexts.

Sources Filled

  1. SPDX Specification 3.0.1 - The Linux Foundation (SPDX Project)
  2. CycloneDX v1.6 JSON Reference - OWASP Foundation / Ecma International (ECMA-424)
  3. ECMA-427 Package-URL (PURL) specification - Ecma International
  4. ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2026 Systems and software engineering — Software life cycle processes - ISO / IEC / IEEE
  5. ISO/IEC 25010:2023 Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) — Product quality model - ISO / IEC (JTC 1/SC 7)
  6. 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) - CISA, NSA, FBI and international partner agencies
  7. Cyber Resilience Act — Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 - European Commission (DG CONNECT)
  8. Common Security Advisory Framework Version 2.0 (OASIS Standard) - OASIS
  9. RFC 3339: Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps - IETF
  10. NIST SP 800-218, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1 - National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
  11. SLSA Security Levels (specification v1.1) - Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF)
  12. Semantic Versioning 2.0.0 - Semantic Versioning project
  13. Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) and the official CPE Dictionary - NIST National Vulnerability Database
  14. CVE Services and the CVE Record Format - CVE Program (CISA / MITRE)
  15. SPDX 3.0.1 Software Profile - The Linux Foundation (SPDX Project)
  16. RFC 9393: Concise Software Identification Tags - Internet Engineering Task Force
  17. ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 Information technology — IT asset management — Part 2: Software identification tag - ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7
  18. 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency with NSA, FBI and international partners
  19. CycloneDX Specification Overview (v1.7 / ECMA-424) - OWASP Foundation and Ecma International TC54
  20. Package-URL (PURL) Specification / ECMA-427 - Ecma International TC54 and package-url maintainers
  21. Software Identification (SWID) Tagging — NIST CSRC project and NISTIR 8060 - National Institute of Standards and Technology
  22. SPDX 3.0.1 Software Package, Sbom, SoftwareArtifact and SbomType - The Linux Foundation and Object Management Group

Open questions

  • SBOM type taxonomy (design, source, build, analyzed, deployed, runtime) plus tool name and version and generation context, to be absorbed as elements of the existing bill-of-materials-document finding rather than a parallel finding, once the CISA element names are verified against the PDF tables.
  • Advisory TLP labelling, sharing constraints, CSAF document status lifecycle (draft, interim, final, withdrawn) and profile selection, as element enrichment of advisory-and-exposure-mapping and of the model's access policy rather than as a separate advisory-identity finding.
  • Endpoint discovery evidence: CoSWID payload versus on-device evidence mutual exclusivity, and comparison of observed endpoint file or image hashes against the published release digest set, as element enrichment of deployed-instance-record.
  • Accessibility conformance, which the base names as a live structural gap with no authoritative source consulted; treating it as a quality subcharacteristic is probably insufficient for products subject to accessibility legislation.
  • Cryptographic bill of materials and cryptographic asset inventory for post-quantum migration planning, currently reachable only through a component-type reference.
  • AI-specific and SaaS-specific extra transparency elements, including the separately published CISA AI SBOM minimum elements, which both providers flag as required extras but neither expands.
  • CoSWID entity role vocabulary (aggregator, distributor, licensor, maintainer) with reg-id naming authority, as elements on producer-and-stewardship so role assertions can be correlated across documents.
  • SPDX 3.1 release-candidate expansion into hardware, safety and operations, tracked as emerging and deliberately excluded from the canonical structure until it is formally published.
  • Product-line variability beyond edition and channel (feature flags, software product lines) and per-jurisdiction export-control classification schemes, neither of which has primary support in either provider run.
  • Source-control history, branch and commit semantics: only a source revision reference appears, inside build provenance.
  • Cryptographic bill of materials and detailed cryptographic asset inventory, which CycloneDX 1.6 supports and which will matter for post-quantum migration planning; it is referenced by component type only.
  • Hardware bill of materials and firmware-to-device binding beyond the hosting platform descriptor.
  • AI-specific documentation such as model cards, training data provenance and evaluation results, delegated by EXTEND rather than modelled, despite AI-enabled software being explicitly in the current SBOM guidance's frontier.
  • Detailed incident and outage records for deployed systems; only configuration change events and update application evidence are held.
  • Localisation, packaging variants and edition matrices, which are treated as separate products or releases without a dedicated variant structure.
  • Cost, resource consumption and sustainability measures of deployed instances.
  • Export-control classification schemes are referenced generically rather than modelled per jurisdiction, because no single authoritative cross-jurisdiction scheme was located.
  • ISO/IEC 19770-2 XML schema annexes were not retrieved in full; CoSWID/RFC 9393 and NISTIR 8060 paraphrases carry the tag information model used here.
  • CISA 2026 PDF body was retrieved as a file but not fully field-extracted; new-element names come from the official landing page and partner summaries and should be re-checked against the PDF tables before implementation.
  • ISO/IEC 19770-3 entitlement schema, ISO/IEC 19770-1 SAM processes and ISO/IEC 19770-6 HWID are not modelled.
  • EU Cyber Resilience Act and BSI TR-03183-2 SBOM requirements are regional obligations not ingested as primary text in this run.
  • CISA Software Bill of Materials for AI — Minimum Elements (May 2026) and SaaS-specific extra elements are flagged as required extras, not expanded.
  • SLSA, in-toto and SPDX Build profile details are only represented as formulation/provenance stubs.
  • SPDX 3.1 RC (January 2026) hardware, safety and operations expansions are emerging and excluded from the canonical structure.
  • Commercial SKU/price-list, export-control classification and dual-use coding have no primary support here.
  • Product-line variability (feature flags, SPL) beyond edition/channel is a gap.
  • Full CPE 2.3 naming specification (NISTIR 7695) was cited via CSAF informative references, not fetched as a standalone primary.

Machine files

Provenance

world-models research · reviewable-draft

Built from: models/wm-sft-001-software-product/spec.yaml, ver-cy/world-models/card-supplements/wm-sft-001-software-product.json